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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS***

No 5, MAY 1989

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[The following are selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

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## World Economics & International Relations

No 5, May 1989

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### English Summary of Major Articles

18160010a Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 5, May 89 pp 158-159

[Text] "Political Reefs of the Caribbean Crisis". Written by S.V. Chugrov, it gives a detailed and profound analysis of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. His article is based on the deliberations of the tripartite symposium on this extremely interesting and complex problem of the Soviet-American relations. The meeting was held in January and attended by foremost political figures and members of the academic community of the Soviet Union, the United States and Cuba. Many of these people were directly involved in the dramatic developments in 1962. The deep and constructive discussions held helped to clarify the positions of all parties which were drawn in the showdown and identify many controversial aspects of the problem on the agenda. The participants in the meeting thoroughly reviewed the causes that had led to the crisis, focused on the developments and analyzed the political moves of all parties and their assessments of the situation. Specific emphasis was laid on an analysis of those steps which had helped to find the way out of the critical situation. This detailed and comprehensive account of the Caribbean crisis is particularly valid and instructive today, since a study of crisis situations of this kind, an analysis of the ways toward their political and diplomatic settlement are extremely relevant in the present world when a new type of political thinking enjoys greater popularity and finds a wider application in the international relations. To draw real lessons from the Cuban crisis one must realize how close the world was to a nuclear catastrophe. The main conclusion to be made from the crisis is that international security can only be secured by political means rather than military power and demonstration of force.

"Monopoly, Oligopoly and Competition". The article under review, written by S. Nikitin, L. Demidova and M. Stepanova, is the second one in a series that deals with economic regulation within the framework of oligopoly when a considerable portion of manufactured goods and services is concentrated in the hands of a limited number of big producers. The character and functioning of oligopolies are determined by the conditions which prevail in the appropriate sectoral and commodity markets.

The authors give an indepth analysis of the economic mechanisms of oligopolies, various methods and techniques of coordinated market policies under different conditions and investigate into the economic role of medium and smallscale businesses and their relations with industrial giants. Particular attention is paid in the article to a review of the situation that existed in the United States in the fifties and sixties and subsequent developments which resulted in stronger monopolic competition in the last two decades. For instance, the authors indicate that internationalization of industrial production erodes oligopolic structures in various sectors of capitalist countries; price competition exceeds the boundaries of individual sectors and industries. Another important issue discussed by the authors is the functioning of oligopolies in the worldwide context, its specific forms and manifestations as compared with the national level. A separate section of the article deals with an analysis of the relations between the state and oligopolies, for instance governmental regulation and control measures. In general, the article is a comprehensive and thorough review of a very interesting and complex problem which stands high on the economic agenda of many countries.

"Transnational Corporations in the World Development". The author of this article, K. Sauvart, investigates into the processes, forms and manifestations of transnational economic activities. The presentday world is characterized by the growing dependence of individual states and their national economies due to expanded operations of transnational corporations. A new approach to the study of TNCs and their contribution to the overall economic development in the world is particularly relevant today, since many Soviet scholars have usually emphasized only their destructive role in the world economy. Written by the deputy director of the research department of the UN centre on transnational corporations, the article in question gives an authoritative view on the problems which is, undoubtedly, is the source of great concern. Analyzing the activities of transnational corporations in the eighties, K. Sauvart notes the influx of capital provided by foreign TNCs to the United States due a speedy economic recovery from the economic crisis. This inflow of capital investments reflected the growing competitiveness of transnational corporations of other countries, Japan in particular. At the same time, the author points out correctly that American have remained in the world economic arena and expanded their operations in the United States. Another new aspect in the activities of transnational corporations is their expansion in the sphere of services and scientific research.

A competent and detailed analysis offered by K. Sauvart will make this article a must for all those who are interested in economic issues.

"On Methodological Principles of the Modelling of Production Modes". Written by V. Matveyev, this article provides a solid analysis and review of general methodological principles which underlie the theory of K. Marx.

The author's approach to the subject is particularly valid and relevant today, since it has been recognized that many basic principles of the socialist economy, which were stipulated by the official political economy, have proved to be meaningless. Therefore, a reassessment of some provisions of the political economy of socialism is a topical and burning issue of perestroika, specifically in the field of commodity and market relations. It is not a secret that these issues were long ignored and underestimated. In the author's view the main reason for these erroneous approaches to economic problems lies in the misunderstanding of K. Marx's tenet about the escalation from abstract concepts to concrete notions.

The size of the article does not permit the author review in detail all the logical elements used by K. Marx to study the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, he attempts to look into those politico-economic results which were obtained by K. Marx by using the technique of escalation from abstract concepts to a concrete analysis of capitalist mode of production.

The author's overall and thorough analysis of the methodological principles employed by K. Marx enables him to draw a number of important conclusions. He deduces, for instance, that new approaches in a politico-economic analysis and modelling of socialist production should be aimed at identifying those features which characterize it as an integrated system. In other words, political economy as a science can study only a mode of production or social production which is being formed as a mode of production. Completing his review of the general methodological principles of K. Marx the author also emphasizes that commodity relations are an immanent element of the formational characteristics of socialist production.

A solid and meaningful article that will help the reader to understand better the fundamental principles of Marxism, its methodology and logic.

"Thinking about Northern Territories". In their article, G. Kunadze and K. Sarkisov attempt to analyze at length the present state of relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. These relations have been stagnant for many years, and the forthcoming visit of M. Gorbachev to Japan will provide a new impetus to their development. At the same time, the authors point out that a new philosophical approach is needed that will enable both countries to promote their relations in a broader historical perspective. One of the major issues that requires urgent solution is the problem of the so-called "northern territories".

Reviewing the historical background of the problem, the authors try to get rid of the usual bias and prejudiced ideas about the stand of Japan and to understand the logic of Japanese officials.

A comprehensive and balanced analysis of the issue suggests, however, that the Japanese claims are groundless and lack historical credibility. The authors tend to believe that the problem of "northern territories" is not

a dead-end street, and its settlement requires good will. In fact, the problem must be dealt with in connection with the general background of bilateral relations and their development in different fields. They outline three main aspects of the problem: a legal, political and politico-psychological facets.

Do both countries have a necessary potential for a peaceful settlement of their conflicting views? At the present stage the answer to this question is negative, but this potential may and must be created and enhanced. Both the Soviet Union and Japan should work for more dynamic processes in the economic, political and cultural spheres of cooperation. What one needs is original and bold ideas capable lessening the tensions in the relations between the two countries and active confidence-building measures.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya",  
1989

### Roundtable on 'Problems of Democratization'

18160010b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 5, May 89 pp 5-18

### Editorial Introduction

[Text]

"The Democratic Alternative: Problems of the Democratization of Present-Day Societies" was the topic of a discussion conducted within the framework of an international roundtable meeting at the end of 1988 in Moscow. It was organized by the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute and the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute at the initiative of the journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA.

The intention of the organizers of the meeting was to assemble at one table representatives of the main currents of the international workers movement—communists, social democrats and socialists. Social scientists and politicians from socialist and capitalist countries of Europe were invited to participate in the meeting. They included G. Chiarante, member of the leadership of the Italian Communist Party; H. Jung, director of the Marxist Studies Institute (FRG); W. Paff, director of the SED Central Committee Social Sciences Academy Institute of Imperialism; J.-C. le Scornet, leader of the Unified Socialist Party (France); E. Mange, member of the Bureau of the Belgian Socialist Party (Flemish) and director of the Vandervelde Institute; S. Holland, member of parliament for the British Labor Party; L. Kangas, head of the International Department of Finland's Social Democratic Party; R.G. Cotarelo, vice president of the Spanish Political Sciences Association; V. Morgenstern of the SED Central Committee Social Sciences Academy

*International Communist Movement Institute; D. Dimitrov, consultant of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee International Department; E. Daynov of the Bulgarian Communist Party History Institute; G. Karasimeonov, head of a department of the journal NOVOYE VREMYA (Bulgaria); P. Havas of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee Social Sciences Institute; I. Huverly of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Central Committee Social Sciences Institute; T. Godlewski of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee Social Sciences Committee; W. Michalski of the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee Social Sciences Committee; O. Sevcik of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute.*

*The Soviet participants in the meeting were the lead research institutes in this field—the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute, the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy, the IMEMO, the International Workers Movement Institute, the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute and the Sociological Studies Institute.*

*With this issue we begin publication of individual speeches of the participants in the roundtable. It will be concluded by a roundup of the discussion conducted in the course of the meeting.*

### Opening Remarks by Primakov

[Text] Brief opening remarks were addressed to the participants in the roundtable by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute:

Dear Comrades and Friends! It affords me particular pleasure to welcome in our institute ideological personnel and representatives of theoretical thought of a number of communist and workers parties. Opening our meeting, Professor Diligenskiy has already said how necessary our exchange of opinions on many theoretical issues is. You know that our party and our social sciences are now elaborating new approaches to surrounding reality. We are abandoning certain dogmatic ideas, endeavoring to draw conclusions based on a realistic assessment of the events which are taking place and regarding Marxist-Leninist teaching mainly as a methodology with which it is possible to explain this process or phenomenon or the other and control it. To speak of the new theoretical problems, I would highlight those which are related directly to the subject proposed for study at our by no means round table in terms of configuration.

First. Our party concluded at the 27th congress that international relations under present conditions cannot be the field where the question of "who wins?" between two opposite social and political systems is decided. Whereas earlier we believed that the sole dependable protection of our security and that of the socialist world was a buildup of military, defensive forces and whereas

earlier we believed that the aggressor, in the event of an attack on our country and on our allies would perish in the flames of the war which it had unleashed, these questions now require a fundamentally different approach. The development of weapons of mass extermination has brought the world to a boundary beyond which is the end of all human civilization, regardless of who started the thermonuclear war or who was the victim of an attack. Under these conditions the problems of the power struggle between the two systems should be taken off the agenda and the practical use of military force must be excluded from the arsenal of the resources which both parties possess in their policy.

The second problem is the interdependence of today's world. We all proceed from the fact that the "motor" of history is the unity and struggle of opposites. But in this formula incorporating the dialectical unity of two opposite principles we have usually put the emphasis on the opposites and have insufficiently examined the common, uniform context in which these opposites develop. The growing unity and interdependence of today's world is a reality, which is expressed not only in the problem of survival, which is common to all mankind, but also in the sharply increased internationalization of production. We are increasingly disposed to the necessity of studying and investigating the regularities of the development of its different parts.

Third—the need for new approaches to the correlation between the revolutionary and evolutionary paths of changes in capitalist society. We in our institute are now for the first time making a serious study of the process of the evolutionary changes of production relations of an intra-formational nature, that is, occurring within the framework of capitalism.

In this connection very great significance is attached to the correlation between monopolization and competition. A dogmatic understanding of the competition-centralization-monopolization chain which has been set up has brought some of our scholars, who in principle have denied or, in any event, underestimated competition, to an impasse. Developing in various forms, however, oligopoly, for example, it prevails, it would seem to us, over strict monopolization. Granted all the contradictoriness of this phenomenon, this affords certain scope for the development of the productive forces in the capitalist world.

The fourth problem is the influence of world socialism. We have said frequently that socialism is having an increasingly great impact on all aspects of world development, but have for some reason or other studied insufficiently the influence which world socialism exerts, via the development of the workers movement included, on the state of affairs (if it may be so put) in capitalist society. Closely connected with this is the problem of the democratic alternative, to which under current conditions is attached not only and not so much theoretical as practical significance.

The changes which are taking place in capitalism are in need of in-depth comprehension and careful study, in which a large group of research personnel of our institute is currently involved.

Having expressed these brief observations, I would like to wish our discussion success. I am sure that it will enrich all its participants. Thank you.

### Institute Members' Theses

\*These theses, representing the position of a group of social scientists of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, were suggested to the participants in the round-table as a point of departure for the discussion.

1. Toward the end of the second millennium of our era humanity has approached an extraordinarily crucial boundary of its history, when the accumulation of the most acute global problems has called in question the fate of civilization and the fate of the human race itself. The emancipation and mobilization of the entire potential of the energy, activity and creativity at the disposal of the world community for its salvation from the menacing danger are becoming a categorical imperative. This in itself presupposes the tremendous significance of the problem of democracy in the modern world. However, this is not the sole factor moving it to the forefront of political life.

2. In Western countries the prospects of the development of democracy have undoubtedly been markedly influenced recently by such phenomena as the neoconservative wave and the crisis of the workers movement and the forces of the left. These phenomena are closely connected with the profound technological revolution and the radical changes in the social structure and also the considerable changes in the mass consciousness which it has brought about. The masses are estranged from political life, and discontent with the traditional parliamentary institutions is widespread.

3. It is obviously important to correctly evaluate how the leading role which has been performed by neoconservatism in the political life of the West in the 1980's is being reflected in the fate of democracy. There is no doubt that a motive of neoconservative ideology and policy was the ruling circles' unease in connection with the limitation of their freedom of action which had been brought about by the "inordinate," from their viewpoint, democratization characteristic of the preceding period with its domination of liberal-reformist methods. The upsurge of mass movements, the broadening of trade union rights, the emergence of increasingly new special-interest groups—all this was perceived as uncontrollable chaos and as a factor violating the sovereignty of the exponents of power. The ideologues of neoconservatism once again extolled the concepts of elitism, meritocracy and anti-egalitarianism. The policy of neoconservative governments has been marked by certain manifestly anti-democratic measures.

At the same time, however, neither the ideology nor, even less, the policy of neoconservatism has, as distinct from the radical-right currents of the past and, to some extent, of the present also, infringed the foundations of parliamentary democracy and the political institutions formulated by many decades of social practice. In addition, the neoconservatives have implemented a number of measures which evidently move in the direction of improvement of this political mechanism. It is a question of an increase in the flexibility and efficiency of the government components of management, the unbureaucraticizing thereof of inordinately unwieldy and bureaucratized structures, decentralization and the transfer to the civil society of many functions of social policy, the incorporation of private initiative in the process of solution of a number of problems, the revision of established methods of "neocorporate" interaction and so forth. The practice and experience of neoconservative policy in these areas are, it would seem to us, of a certain value also for forces of the left troubled by the formulation of the answer to the problems of contemporary development.

4. At the same time it is difficult, it seems to us, to dispute the fact that, on the whole, in the sphere of democracy, as in many other spheres, the policy of the neoconservatives does not by its very nature correspond to the fundamental requirements of present and future. While taking advantage up to a certain limit of certain trends of the mass consciousness (the protest against bureaucratism and the omnipotence of the state, the aspiration to a broadening of personal initiative, recognition of the self-worth of the individual and so forth) it is simultaneously endeavoring to impart a paternalist tint to the entire decision-making process, concentrate the decisive levers of power within a small circle of "competent" persons, limit the "unchecked" interference of the public in fundamental issues of management to the utmost and fragment and render powerless democratic organizations.

The neoconservatives, who put the diktat of the economy above all else, are avoiding, specifically, the accomplishment of a task advanced by reality—the creation of a democratic mechanism providing for society's control over technological development, a mechanism not fettering this development but forestalling its dangerous social and ecological consequences.

5. The struggle around this fundamental issue could in the future, evidently, become a central direction in which a democratic alternative to neoconservative policy will take shape. The viability of the democratic alternative here will be determined, it would seem to us, by the extent to which it takes account of the experience of neoconservatism, that is, not only that which is new which it has introduced to social practice but also the limits which its method of problem-solving has revealed and, correspondingly, the knots which it has not succeeded in untying. Alternative methods of problem-solving will obviously be realistic here to the extent to which they are based on the processes taking place in the mass consciousness.

6. Proceeding from this, we may further cite a whole number of imperatives which stimulate the elaboration of a democratic alternative. One such is the forestalling

of the political marginalization of considerable masses of the population, which is born largely of social marginalization and as a consequence of unchecked technological modernization. Despite the palliative methods of its neutralization employed by the neoconservatives, social and political marginalization is fraught with the risk of a serious disruption of the social balance, increased extremism of right and left and a growing alienation from democratic institutions.

Neoconservative policy ignores and at time stimulates even the anti-democratic consequences of the development of information science, uneven access to information and the unchecked nature of the actions of its possessors under conditions where access to it is becoming a most important sphere of influence and power. The problem of the creation of a democratic mechanism providing for both the prevention of monopolization in this sphere and citizens' protection against the abuse of information is a field in which the advancement of constructive new ideas alternative to the neoconservative approaches is perfectly possible.

Neoconservative policy operates on behalf of the individual, endeavoring to interpret in its own way the aspiration growing in the mass consciousness toward personal self-sufficiency, independent activity and self-expression. However, neoconservatism knows predominantly one direction of satisfying such interests—privatization and the stimulation of private, including entrepreneurial, initiative. Granted all the attractiveness of this prospect for quite broad circles, it leaves on one side the aspects of personal development which make of man a social being, that is, fail to provide for the harmonious development of the personality and its combination with the interests of other people. The harmonious development of the social individual and satisfaction of a whole range of man's requirements as a personality and citizen are undoubtedly a most promising direction of the search for an alternative to neoconservative concepts.

The democratization and humanization of society are evidently goals which will have to play a primary part in the structuring of the democratic alternative. Despite the profound differences in ideas concerning the paths and specific forms of the achievement of these goals, their significance is now recognized by communists, social democrats, the new social movements inspired by libertarian ideas and even many forces outside of the left part of the political spectrum. It is believed that the advancement and success of the democratic alternative are impossible without the participation of all these forces.

7. The present alienation of considerable masses from politics and representative institutions is hardly surmountable without fundamental changes in the political mechanism which could breathe new life into it and interest the masses in the political process. Political practice does not confirm one-sided advantages either of classical representative systems or of so-called "direct" democracy. The search which is now under way aimed at

finding the optimum combination of both principles is, therefore, natural. It is becoming increasingly clear that in our time a really efficient, flexible and democratic system cannot fail to be differentiated to the maximum extent, combining within it both the necessary component of centralism and various levels of decentralization and ramified forms of the direct connection and feedback of the state and the civil society and their day-to-day contacts and cooperation. Both the experience of all preceding decades and that of the neoconservatives are obviously important here.

The future will undoubtedly be modified considerably by the forms of organization and activity of parties—the democratic institution in the grip of crisis to the greatest extent. The experience of the new social movements suggests, in our view, the main direction of these changes.

Contemporary development in society has created a tremendous multitude of diverse interests unknown to history in the past. A task of the future and of a more consummate democratic arrangement is, evidently, the creation of civilized conditions for their expression and consideration and their concordance in the interests of the whole of society.

8. For several decades the different approach to problems of democracy was the main divide between the communist and social democratic movements. Dictatorship of the proletariat as a fundamentally new type of democracy necessary in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism or progress toward socialism under the conditions of traditional parliamentary democracy and political pluralism—such up to the 1940's-1950's approximately was the decisive dilemma of the workers movement in Europe. The realities of the new political regime which took shape in history's first socialist country—the Soviet Union—and then in a number of East European countries imparted to this dilemma a directly practical character and increased to a considerable extent the ideological and political polarization of the continent's forces of the left.

The experience of the struggle against fascism showed that on questions of democracy there is not only disagreement but also affinity between the different currents of the workers movement. Its development and recognition were subsequently promoted by the 20th CPSU Congress and the dismantling of Stalinist political practices in the USSR. Propositions (on the questions of parliamentary institutions, a multi-party structure, the peaceful path of socialist revolution and so forth) appeared in the program documents of West European communist parties and the international communist movement in the 1950's-1970's which, marking a revision of a number of positions of the times of the Comintern, reduced the contrast of communist and social democratic views on these questions. Nonetheless, the political situation in a number of socialist countries and the continuing contradiction therein between democratic constitutional principles and the reality of

authoritarian-bureaucratic power continued to maintain the discrepancy between the struggle for democracy in West Europe and the sociopolitical practice of socialism. Perestroika and democratization in the USSR may be regarded as a process initiating the surmounting of this discrepancy and engendering a fundamentally new relationship between the development of socialism and the activity of capitalist countries' democratic forces. Consequently, more practicable opportunities than ever are afforded for the constructive dialogue of communists and social democrats on problems of democracy.

9. Quite profound differences remain and, obviously, will persist in the foreseeable future between the processes of democratization under the conditions of socialist and capitalist societies. In capitalist countries their development presupposes limitation of the political influence of monopoly capital and its relations with the machinery of state. Democratization is possible here only on the basis of the existing multi-party political structure and the free activity of the political opposition. In the socialist countries the obstacle in the way of democratization is not the haute bourgeoisie, which is absent in them, but the centralizing-bureaucratic structures of economic and political power. The practicable path of struggle against bureaucracy at the current stage would seem to be not the development of a political opposition but a radical strengthening of democratic trends in the policy of the ruling parties and democratization of their internal structure, the growing independence and broadening of the rights of the mass organizations, elective authorities and the workforce, the genuine electivity of all echelons of power and administration, the development of mass democratic movements and the intensification on this basis of direct relations and feedback between the authorities and the civil society. An extension of socialist pluralism, the conversion of debate into an organic feature of social and practical life and democratic procedures of the preparation and adoption of political decisions will be possible as the result of these processes. A most important feature of political democratization under the conditions of present-day socialism is its close connection with a radical increase in the independence of the subjects of economic activity—the socialist enterprises.

10. Analyzing the paths and prospects of the democratization of the socialist society, account has to be taken of the far from analogous approach to these problems in different socialist countries reflecting differences in their historical development and in the present-day economic and sociopolitical situations. It is important to bear in mind also the sharply increased dynamism of these situations today, to which the process of economic and political reforms, the growth of the social and political assertiveness of the masses and the intensive search for optimum forms of the organization of society are imparting particular intensity. It would be wrong to regard today's forms of democratization as the framework for its further development.

11. Granted all the specifics and differences in the social and political processes in capitalist and socialist countries, there is an affinity of certain tendencies of the economic and social life of all industrially developed societies; this affinity engenders, if not analogous, largely close goals and problems.

One such problem, rather, a whole highly complex set of problems, is connected with the need to subordinate S&T and economic development to the interests of man. Disregard for these interests is embodied in the ideology and practice of technocratism, which is manifested in various forms in the activity of economic and political institutions of different societies. The humanization of the social consequences of the S&T process in such societies as employment, the conditions, content and organization of labor, the quality of life and consumption, education and information and improvement of the environment and way of life is unattainable without the democratization of administration in all these fields. And although the social sources of technocratism in different societies are different—in some it is connected largely with the egotistical interests of big business, in others, with the bureaucratic nature of state power—democratic and humanitarian alternatives to the technocratic solution of specific problems can and must be elaborated on a global scale.

12. A most important stimulus of democratization is under modern conditions the process of the bureaucratization of economic and political power. Its forms and scale also are highly dissimilar in different societies. However, bureaucratization everywhere essentially poses one and the same problem: how to combine the centralized regulation of economic and social processes necessary to the modern society with the independence and self-management of different communities—ethnic, local, production and economic, occupational and so forth, the freedom of individual development and people's participation in the decisions determining their living conditions. The vital relevance of this problem for a number of socialist societies is intensified by the crisis phenomena in the economy and social sphere which are born of bureaucratic centralism, and it is creating serious collisions in capitalist countries also. Whence the possibility of a joint search for a democratic alternative to bureaucratism.

13. A most important component of such an alternative is the working people's participation in the management of production and the economy or economic democracy. At a certain stage of the development of the productive forces and man himself this participation becomes an indispensable condition of the normal functioning of production and the whole national economy.

The successful introduction of economic democracy is inconceivable without the presence of a certain minimum of political rights and liberties. On the other hand, as things develop, political democracy also is conditioned by the level of development of economic democracy.



But the interdependence of economic and political democracy by no means amounts merely to such dependence. There is also a more direct, institutional connection between them. At a certain level economic democracy crosses over to political democracy, as it were, and "blends" with it, and a whole number of its institutions are merely predominantly institutions of economic democracy. The same occurs with the bodies and establishments of political democracy, which, as things develop, lose their political "purity" and perform both the functions of political and socioeconomic control. As economic democracy develops, there is an interpenetration of the institutions of political and economic democracy and a qualitatively new political system reflecting the higher level of economic and political relations of the given society essentially emerges.

We regard what has been said above as the most general trend of the development of economic democracy in any modern society, whether capitalist or socialist. But this by no means signifies that both the specific paths and forms of the development of economic democracy and its "limits" are the same or approximately the same under the conditions of capitalism and socialism and that there are no qualitative distinctions between them.

14. From the general theoretical viewpoint economic democracy under the conditions of capitalism is nothing other than a means of modification of property relations. While not changing these relations fundamentally, economic democracy nonetheless contributes to the process of the socialization of capitalist property and the introduction to the administration thereof, besides the proprietors and managers themselves, of persons of wage labor and their representatives. In the event of the sufficiently profound introduction thereof to managerial structures, it introduces qualitatively new components to the very nature of the ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange under capitalism. Such an intrusion may be compared with the "managerial revolution" which appreciably limited the right of the owners of capital to administer it and, correspondingly, sharply enhanced the social and political role of the manager. With the very appreciable difference, however, that the managerial revolution occurred practically everywhere and was completed quite rapidly, whereas the working people's participation in management is being introduced far more slowly, and this process itself is distinguished by great unevenness, what is more, and there is ebb and flow. As is known, there has been a marked increase in recent years in capital's resistance to the introduction of this form or the other of the participation in management of the working people and their organizations at practically all levels, and in a number of countries in which the neoconservatives are in office, what is more, this participation is manifestly on the decline. The reverse movement is particularly noticeable at the sectoral and national levels, where under the flag of limitation of "the power of the unions," struggle

against "corporatism" and protection of consumer interests against the "diktat of the manufacturer" the neoconservatives have advocated virtually the total dismantling of the "mixed" managerial structures created since the war.

The impressive successes scored by the conservatives in this field are explained not least by the fact that they managed to feel out a truly vulnerable spot in the current systems of production and economic democracy, namely, the absence in many of them of a connection with the tasks of an increase in economic efficiency and competitiveness and an acceleration of S&T progress. Under conditions where these tasks have moved to the forefront and the overall state of the economy and the level of employment and the working people's well-being have come to depend on their accomplishment to an ever increasing extent, it was not that difficult for the neoconservatives to persuade their countries' population of the need for a limitation of the "excessive power of corporate institutions" and their main components—the unions—allegedly impeding the accomplishment of these tasks.

The problem of the connection between economic democracy and production efficiency which has surfaced is confronting political forces of the workers movement with difficult dilemmas and forcing them to make a difficult choice. The passiveness and indecisiveness of the theorists and men of practice of the workers movement on this question are creating for it serious dangers inasmuch as the intensive introduction of projects and plans of participation emanating from big capital is under way. It is a question of so-called neopaternalism, which, as distinct from the old, traditional paternalism, signifies not simply the patronage of a "benefactor"-employer in exchange for the diligence of the worker but something more complex. First, the role of the "employer" is no longer performed by the boss of the enterprise or firm but its management representing a far broader circle of interested persons and an entire managerial structure. Second, this is no longer assertiveness at the top and social passiveness below (given higher labor assertiveness) but, rather, a reciprocal movement whereby each side participates, albeit to a far from equal extent, in the organization of production and managerial decision-making.

Judging by the speed with which neopaternalism is winning for itself new supporters and spreading in breadth and in depth, there is evidently reason to believe that it could in time become (if it is not already becoming) a particular feature of the capitalism of the end of the 20th-start of the 21st centuries. The question has arisen as to whether neopaternalism contains elements which combined with the traditional systems of participation could contribute to the creation of a more democratic model thereof. And whether it is not on this path that practicable opportunities could be afforded for the union movement's way out of the most severe crisis in which it has found itself since the end of the 1970's. The sources of this crisis, it would seem to us, are to be

found by no means only in the new economic situation, the decline of the traditional sectors and the structural changes which the work force is undergoing. They are to be found also in the unions' loss of precise reference points and prospects and the weakening of their capacity for providing adequate answers to the requirements and sentiments of the working people and acting as their consolidating, and not disuniting, force.

The synthesis of "representative" economic democracy, chiefly via the unions, and direct economic democracy, exercised at the work place, could evidently grow as a new attribute at higher levels of management of the economy also and contribute to the surmounting of the defects of the neocorporate model. It is as yet impossible to say, of course, what the specific paths of the achievement of this synthesis and what the new model of participation should represent. But hardly anyone would take issue with the fact that the further development of economic democracy has "come up against" the inadequacy of its present forms and the new development which the economy is undergoing and the new processes which are occurring in the structure, consciousness and mentality of persons of wage labor.

15. Economic democracy is called on to play a decisive part in the renewal of socialism. The task of tasks to be tackled by perestroika in the USSR is the surmounting of the working people's alienation from property and labor and its results, which has reached a truly critical level and begun to threaten the very existence of the social and political system of socialism. There are no other ways of overcoming alienation under the conditions of the continuation of state ownership of the means of production than the development of genuine economic democracy.

The introduction of self-managing principles in the economic and political mechanism of Soviet society has been advanced by the CPSU as a principal goal of perestroika. The self-management slogan has come to be implemented, and its realization is provided for in the socialist enterprise act and a number of other legislative enactments and proposals. The elections of enterprise and association directors have come to be held everywhere, and workforce councils are being created. Granted all this, the enlistment of the working people in the managerial process is proceeding extremely slowly and experiencing the tremendous "strength of the material".

The mutual mistrust between the working people and management, which has built up over decades, is leading to far from optimum versions of the participation in management being created in practice. The dogmatically understood "power-sharing" principle prompting some to view the administration as a purely executive authority, given self-managing institutions, and others to assign these latter the role of talking-shop devoid of real powers is contributing to this also. As a result either a confrontational or conflict-free model of "self-management" is being created more often than not in the course of the act's practical realization.

In the first case the enterprise (association) council elected by the work force, endeavoring to assert its independence, does everything to place the administration under its strict supervision and remove it from the preparation and adoption of fundamental managerial decisions. As a consequence of this allocation of roles there is frequently a diarchy, which, naturally, cannot last for any length of time. Therefore, either by way of trial and error this model will be perfected or the administration will gain the upper hand, and that same conflict-free model will be firmly established.

In the second case, when a skeptical attitude on the part of the administration toward the independent activity of the "immature" masses gains the upper hand, it succeeds, as a rule, in converting the "self-managing" institutions into its appendage, and there can no longer be any question of any real self-management here.

Whereas in the first case there is thus at least the probability of real progress en route to the introduction of the masses to the management of production, in the second case such a possibility is practically precluded, more, a steady skepticism and cynicism even arise, overcoming which is even more difficult than the "traditional" alienation.

An unsolved problem of the practice of introduction of self-managing principles is that they are mainly being confined to enterprise level and have little connection with the reform of the political system. This, naturally, is depriving self-management of the necessary integrity and simultaneously reducing the strength of the self-managing structures which the enthusiasts of self-managing socialism are succeeding in establishing.

The optimum model of socialist self-management, in our opinion, cannot be either conflict-free or confrontational. It must be of a moderate-conflict nature, that is, free of both extremes and geared to the constructive cooperation of the workforce and management in the search for mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of both this workforce itself and society as a whole. The real "positions of strength" of the workforce and its representatives and dependable guarantees that they will be real participants in the management process and directly incorporated therein should be distinguished from its "conflict-free" model. The administration's direct participation in the work of the self-managing structures and the organic combination of the principles of self-management and the principles of professionalism should be distinguished from its confrontational model.

The elaboration of a self-managing model and its principles and mechanisms may be fruitful only if self-management is viewed not simply as a collection of this or that institution but as an integral system, which alone can work precisely as a system, and not one that is enclosed within itself, what is more, but one which is organically linked with the entire economic and political mechanism, penetrating it right to the very top.

16. An essential condition of the successful accomplishment of these tasks is study of the theories and concepts of economic democracy which exist in Western countries and also an in-depth scientific analysis of the experience of participation in management which is available there. It would seem essential to separate from this experience that which is of general significance, that is, everything that corresponds to the objective processes of the development of production and the "human factor" typical of any society and that which is specific which is born of the given, capitalist, form of social relations. It is no less important to reveal the social and political context which contributes to or, on the contrary, impedes the introduction of various forms of economic democracy and the role performed here by the workers movement itself, its political parties and the unions at all the main levels of the economy and policy.

But if for a scientific elaboration of the problems of economic democracy under the conditions of socialism study of the theory and practice of the Western countries is essential, there is a reverse dependence also: the experience of socialism could be of interest to the workers movement of capitalist countries. However far participation in management has progressed in some of them, it cannot, merely owing to the ownership relations themselves, achieve its optimum there. At the same time, on the other hand, despite the inadequacy of the experience which has been accumulated as yet, very appreciable progress of the democratization of management of the economy is possible under socialist conditions which could be used in the West. And although the West's workers movement will hardly be able or want to copy this experience, study thereof could clearly define both more distant possibilities and goals of the democracy of participation and ways toward it. In our opinion, this also would be a dependable and fruitful method of enrichment of the theory and practice of the surmounting of capitalism and ascertainment of the role which may be performed here by economic democracy.

### 'Italian Anomaly'

[by G. CHIARANTE]

[Text] The problem of the democratic alternative or, more precisely, the full realization of consummate democracy under the conditions of Italian society should be viewed with regard for the particular features of the country's political development since the war. But these features themselves may be correctly understood if they are analyzed within the framework of the more general problem of the full democratization of society—such as it presents itself in the developed capitalist countries of the West.

The specifics of Italy or what at one time was called the **Italian anomaly** are primarily the fact that this is the sole West European country in which there has not since 1945 been a change in office of alternative political coalitions expressing different economic and social interests and different currents in culture. The Christian democrats have throughout this period been the party of the relative majority—the governing party by definition.

Whereas in other countries changes in political development have occurred as the result of the alternation in office of moderate and left, progressive-reformist parties, in Italy—in considerably more subdued form—as the result of changes in the correlation of forces between various currents within the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and also the change of its political allies. For example, the switch in 1960 from a center (the DC in an alliance with the liberals, social democrats and republicans) to a center-left coalition (the same DC, but on this occasion in alliance with the socialists, social democrats and republicans), and then in the 1970's growing openness in respect of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) (the culmination of this process was the formation in 1976-1977 of a program majority which incorporated the Communist Party also). In 1979-1980 this program majority once again gave way to a coalition excluding the communists and relying on an agreement of five parties: the Christian democrats, socialists, social democrats, republicans and liberals.

The fact that for the greater part of this decade the government has not been headed by a DC representative, as had unfailingly been the case earlier (in 1981-1982 the head of the government was the Republican G. Spadolini, it was then headed for almost the entire period of the 1983-1987 legislature by the socialist B. Craxi), has not signified a decisive break with evolved tradition. Indeed, although in the first half of the 1980's the DC incurred certain losses at the elections, which increased the political influence of its allies (their "coalition power," as the political scientists have it), the socialists particularly, the DC retained a majority, however, in both the Spadolini and Craxi governments. Both these cabinets were inheritors and continuers which did not upset the continuity of the system of power created in preceding decades by governments led by the Christian democrats.

Owing to the lack of alternation in office of different sociopolitical forces, Italian democracy—and this is its most obvious singularity—has acquired the character of a "lame-duck" democracy, that is, a democracy in whose mechanism a particular political bloc constantly plays the part of governing force (expanding and contracting, but, as shown, without appreciable disruptions in continuity), and considerable numbers of the population here represented by the Communist Party have constantly been excluded from government and condemned to an opposition role.

It is also the case that with time this pattern became less rigid and acquired a certain flexibility. This was expressed in the establishment of the type of relations between the government majority and the opposition which in Italian political life came to be called "consociative democracy," that is, the government began to a certain extent to take account of the contribution of the opposition (in parliamentary activity primarily), thus partially satisfying the interests of the strata of the population which it represented. The high point of the development of "consociative democracy" was reached in the 1970's—with the establishment of the so-called

assembly type of government characterized by the broad enlistment of parliament in the process of the formulation of decisions, programs and laws. Some most significant institutional and social reforms—introduction of provincial self-management, reforms of the pension system and health care, the enactment of a statute of worker rights and the divorce law and so forth—were implemented at that time. Then, as of 1976, a program majority, which has, as mentioned, incorporated all constitutional parties, was formed.

However, even the experience of “consociative democracy” failed to remove—even intensified in some respects—the manifest flaws in the realization of democracy brought about by the absence of the renewal of the ruling forces. Mention should be made primarily of the increased endeavor of the parties in office to identify themselves with the state (which has been a cause of the spread of corruption, machinations and circumvention of the laws) and also the more active attempts to discriminate against the Communist Party and thereby place part of the population in the position of second-class citizens.

For this reason a basic problem of Italian politics remains the creation of the conditions for realization of an efficient democratic alternative, in the form of a government alternative included. Neither the policy of “historic compromise” or “democratic solidarity” pursued by the communists in the 1970’s nor the policy of competition with the DC in the center zone which the Socialist Party under the leadership of B. Craxi has attempted to realize recently have achieved this goal. For this reason the question of new paths to the creation of conditions for the alternative remains open for Italy’s forces of the left. No other way of breaking this chain of moderate governments and taking a decisive step forward in society’s democratic development is in sight.

This is the specific character of the problem of a democratic alternative in Italy, but it is the case also that it does not boil down to a government alternative. In the Italian situation increasingly great significance is attached also to problems of democratization entirely similar to those which exist in other West European countries.

Viewing the situation from this angle, it has to be considered that trends toward not an increase but a diminution in democracy have been operating recently in all developed capitalist countries. These trends and the processes in the course of which they are realized have been expressed in the theoretical plane in the well-known concept whose supporters maintain that in the industrial or post-industrial society there is a “surplus of social demands” and call for a “reining in” or diminution in the demands which are being advanced by way of the adoption of decisions leading to an appreciable constriction of democracy. The reason given for this is the need to bring it into line with the possibilities of the economic and political system.

Specifically, the trend toward a narrowing of democracy is expressed in diverse forms, among which the following should be emphasized particularly. First, there is an increasingly pronounced movement of real power in the sphere of the economy and information, which determine society’s development, to centers free of democratic control, where the real command functions are concentrated in the hands of a few people. The increasing concentration of economic and social functions and communications facilities and also changes brought about by S&T progress, which are disrupting the traditional production and social conditions which served as the basis for the particular influence of the unions and other organizations of the working people, and, finally, the crisis of the policy of the programming and, as a whole, of the structures of the so-called social state are contributing to this.

Second, relations between parliament as the organ of popular representation and the government as a bureaucratic structure more sensitive to the pressure of the ruling classes are changing. The tendency to emphasize the need for a broadening of the power of government and, correspondingly, a lessening of the role of parliamentary bodies in the exercise of the functions of leadership, programming and control has predominated here in recent years.

Third, the growing internationalization is reducing the role of the national state (and it is it which has been the traditional level of organization of the social state), and decision-making is switching to multinational centers of economic power and institutions of supranational communities, where the influence of popular and left forces at both the political and union levels is as yet even less.

Finally, the extensive spread of prosperity and abundance even is not doing away with the existence of profound inequality, vast zones of marginalization and situations of scandalous injustice, which is in fact limiting for many citizens the possibility of the effective realization of democracy and democratic rights. To this it should be added that the dramatic gap between the world’s North and South is no longer simply an external factor but is increasingly becoming—owing to the mass nature of immigration from “third world” countries—a reality and internal contradiction of the rich countries of the West.

It is becoming obvious in the face of these processes that the problem of democracy does not amount to a question of “rules of the game” and correct relations between the majority and opposition and represented and representatives. Of course, rules of the game are important, but the question of who controls the transformations which are taking place is becoming the main problem of democracy. The broadening of democracy and the exercise of democratic leadership of the transformations are goals which may be achieved only by way of energetic mass struggle. They are the objects of a confrontation which is already unfolding not only in the ideological sphere but also between different social groups and special-interest

coalitions, between supranational and national forces and between forces of conservative restoration and movements for a broadening of freedom and a civilized spirit, which are as yet weak, but which are deeply rooted in Italian and European society.

The struggle for the full democratization of society is in our day approaching a turning point, the moment of a qualitative leap forward. The need to overcome theoretical and practical limitations impeding the full realization of democracy arises. Full democracy is a goal which is historically ripe both from the viewpoint of social and cultural evolution and the level of awareness. The concept of full and consummate democracy is being revealed in all its depth as a **socialist** concept.

Under the conditions of the giant processes of the reorganization and concentration of economic, political and financial power which have been occurring in these years in our society it is essential to begin realization of a new democratic course. Without it, the gains of political democracy could be devalued. The manipulation of consensus creates a threat to the very foundations of the functioning of political democracy. Democracy must encompass all centers of power regulating relations between people in their activity—political, economic and social. These bodies have a tendency to grow owing to the very complexity of relations between people in contemporary society. The broadening of democracy signifies new guarantees of the rights and freedoms which have already been won and the winning of new rights and duties. There must be no authorities which are not in principle subordinate to democratic rules, and there are no rights which can be realized outside of these rules.

The limits imposed on democracy by the defense of a profoundly unjust societal arrangement amount to authorities which are not controlled and not monitored and rights which are not democratically guaranteed and not recognized. The task of the left is to spread democracy to the centers of power and to the rights which are not yet democratically regulated. It is here that the struggle for "consummate" democracy coincides with the realization of socialist ideals, and it is here that the true divide between right and left runs.

For this reason we say in the draft document for the impending congress submitted for discussion by the Central Committee that "there is a new dimension of problems and contradictions and forces and actual power, which prompts us to declare **that democracy is not the path to socialism but the path of socialism itself.**"

There would seem to be three main points in the elaboration of this prospect:

1) a concept and program of economic and social policy in which the central problem is leadership of the process of development and transformations;

2) a formulation of the problem of institutional reforms which is geared primarily to securing the rights of the citizens;

3) a European vision which sets as the main goal the creation of a bloc of the left—alternative and democratic—which could lay claim to the control of supranational integration processes.

### 'Political Modernism' Rejected

[by E. DAYNOV]

The all-European attitude has already reached the level of political phraseology. But it has yet to be comprehended conceptually. A change of viewpoint and methodology of analysis are needed for this. The formational approach is, in my view, at an impasse, where it will remain in the foreseeable future also.

A historical, "civilizational" approach is needed to overcome this impasse. It is free of the flaws typical of structural functionalism and is distinguished by flexibility and diachronicity and permits generalizations. This approach is capable of revealing the essence of the era: people's world-vision, which determines and is the motive for their plans and actions.

The world-vision characteristic of a particular era permeates man's entire activity—the production of iron and theories in the sphere of physics, politics and art. This makes it possible to separate the era's world-vision from the sphere of art, where it makes itself known most distinctly, and then trace how its characteristic principles are manifested in the sphere of politics, which is the main object this analysis.

The main feature of the world-vision of representatives of the modern era is belief in "definitive ideas," clear and simple principles, reason and an uncomplicated attractive future. In this sense the contemporary era could until recently have been seen as an era of modernism.

Analyzing the basic directions of modernism in the example of architecture, C. Jenks, an art critic of a left persuasion, concludes that the "new architecture," as a creation of the Enlightenment, has inherited its characteristic naive ideas... (it) makes mistakes which are, on the whole, typical of our era, which is attempting to design itself fully and from scratch on rational grounds." The tendency toward the decisive and total restructuring of the universe by man the creator is the logical result of modernist ideas. The creators of the new aesthetics—the architects W. Gropius and L. Mies van der Rohe and the artists P. Mondrian, K. Malevich and W. Kandinsky—pointed to the need to determine principles on whose basis a new order in human life could be designed.

A strong imprint of modernism is borne also by currents which at first sight deny reason, the Logos. Intuitivism may serve as an example. An aspiration to the discovery of simple principles lying behind the cloak of daily occurrence in order on the basis thereof, following the destruction of the old, to design a new reality may be clearly discerned therein also. "Active simplicity" was how the French poet and representative of Dadaism, Tristan Tzara, wrote about this in the "Manifesto of Dada".

We may for convenience, consequently, distinguish two types of modernist world-vision: "classical" (rationalist) and "romantic" (intuitive), which frequently appear also as a single whole. In politics this is a synthesis embodied in revolutionary Marxism: destruction of all that is old (romantic modernism) and the creation of what is totally new (rationalistic modernism).

The axis of the modernist "universe" is the reduction principle. It reduces the multilevel and indeterminate nature and discordance of the world to "two Leviathans"—function and structure. Modernism abstracts itself from all that is "secondary" and concentrates only on the "essentials," attempting to create clear, pure models without admixtures and "eclecticism". All that is outside of the "essentials" is perceived as a superfluous ornament and decoration. Reduction, bringing down to the "essentials," naturally leads to unification and standardization. The "diffusion" of the individual principle, the absorption of the individual by the sphere of the subconscious and the instinctive, is characteristic of the romantic modernists also.

Thus the base features of modernism are mass character, disappearance of the individual, reduction, standardization, the absolute character and simplicity of definitive truths, efficacy, utopianism and totality of compass and intent. In consummate form the set of these characteristics engenders in the consciousness a very familiar image—totalitarianism.

In the form of a "definitive idea" modernism announced its presence as a particular world-vision at the start of the 20th century. However, the process of formation of its fundamental principles encompassed an entire period of recent history. In politics modernism was manifested in the "renaissance" principle of the putting right of a world imperfect in its motley and chaotic nature and also in an endeavor to demystify and "desymbolize" it. Beginning with a rejection of the historically conditioned specificity of the medieval consciousness, political modernism ultimately cast aside altogether the historicity category and concentrated efforts on the search for eternal, transcendently simple and "definitive" truths, in accordance with which the social arrangement should be modeled. There thus appeared the concept of the sovereign, self-determining and self-sufficient state above private interests. Subsequently, however, the danger of despotism on the part of the independent and free (above the law) state came to be recognized.

This was a pivotal moment. The point being that the arrival of the masses in the political arena at the turn of the century led to the appearance of a phenomenon which may be called the late re-ideologization of the state. Where this process captured societies with long-standing democratic traditions, the very nature of these societies played the part of limiter: the state is re-ideologized not on a purely modernist basis. In countries where, on the other hand, such traditions were lacking, modernism became the basis on which the state was re-ideologized.

Within the framework of recent times attempts to substantiate the need for the re-ideologization of the state may be found in the teachings of utopian socialism and communism. The utopianists developed a whole set of ideas and principles of the modernist state. This state monitors the performance of labor service and the private life of the citizens, relying, in some versions, on a system of all-embracing tale-bearing. Within the framework of the utopian tradition the state appears to be "renaissance," suprallegal and particularly authoritarian. Like all varieties of modernism, the utopian tradition is based on simplification and reduction of the "secondary" to the "essential": it is here that the conviction in the post-capitalist state that only a negligible number of laws will be preserved and that in the future all formal laws and government institutions have to wither away completely takes shape. There is also a fascination with technology, machinery and mechanisms and technocratic ideas. The tendency toward the standardization of the citizens, and also, to the reduction of all forms of human existence to collective forms, is strongly expressed. The entire (with a few exceptions) set of problems of the individual is taken off the agenda, and the statistical-average producer and consumer, who is "equal" to any other (and replaceable by another likewise), comes on the scene. Recognizing no limitations, the state becomes the initiator and organizer of all activity in society.

Neither was Marx able to fully overcome modernist ideas. Initially (in the course of the argument with [Geyntsen]) he rejected the idea of the creation of a state based on the rule of law after a revolution and reduced the solution of the problem simply to the establishment of the "dominion" of the working class. "The Communist Manifesto" says that "the proletariat establishes its own state..." and in "Critique of the Gotha Program" the new state is already the clearly designated dictatorship of the proletariat. But dictatorship is a far simpler and more centralized and reduced form compared with a democracy based on the rule of law. In Stalin's version all this became the most modernist (totalitarian) state in the history of mankind.

However, even in the maximally simplified form such a state was not at all about to "wither away," as had been prescribed. In accordance with the utopian tradition, in the post-revolution East European societies the state deprived the civil society of the economic initiative, taking it into its own hands. Inasmuch as all tasks were reduced to the "most essential"—production of the means of production—the entire diversity of the citizens' specific requirements was excluded from the sphere of economic activity. The view of the world as a variety of machinery was the source of voluntarism and the feeling of omnipotence over the universe, which could be adjusted or changed by following the simple blueprint. Problems of freedom, choice and pluralism were beyond discussion. All was diffused into control. The understanding of freedom as man's "dominion" over nature and himself led to ecological catastrophes

and the domination of the elect—those who have recognized the world “scientifically” and who express “fundamental interests”—over all the rest.

In other words, the political arrangement of post-revolution East European societies reflected the extreme degree of modernism which Western societies (with the exception of the brief period of fascism) have managed to keep outside of politics.

State modernism attempted to solve all questions not only “fundamentally” (that is, in accordance with pure models without admixtures and “eclecticism”) but also totally, at a single “heroic” stroke. As the chiliastic tasks revealed their impracticability, the “mobilizing” myths in these societies were replaced not by a sobering-up but “protective” myths. The official ideology became magic. Management—which in such systems merges with society altogether—becomes impotent. The further decrepitude of modernist ideological magic reaches a point where the facts of reality are primordially excluded from consideration, when, as H. Marcuse put it, “**genuine reality**” becomes “incorrect”.

To overcome modernism and implement democratization it is essential first of all to turn to the experience of the West, where there has always been criticism of political modernism. Just a year after the storming of the Bastille the British philosopher E. Burke formulated a proposition whose essence amounted to the fact that the complexity of society and “the affairs of man” meant that “simple methods of control are aboriginally inadequate.” Also his was the profound thought that the greater the doctrinal purity of revolutionary ideas, the less suitable they are in the sphere of morality and politics. A. de Tocqueville developed the tradition of post-modernist political philosophy. He determined precisely the impossibility of the total control of society on the part of the state. De Tocqueville showed the importance for the health of society of the existence of several centers of power and also structures which mediate relations between the central authorities and the individual. He also showed in the example of France how denial of the complex nature of the political arrangement of society leads to a centralization of authority and the atomization of the citizens. Analyzing the actions of the central authorities in the example of the United States, he noted the incompatibility of centralized administration and the healthy development of society: “the administrative centralization of power may, it must be admitted, combine in some particular era and in a particular place all the forces at a nation’s disposal, but it does not contribute to the reproduction of these forces.... It may thus contribute to the transient greatness of some individual or other, but can do nothing for the stable prosperity of the people.”

Formerly “written off” as “reactionary,” the post-modernist criticism of the 19th century is today extremely topical in view of the obvious impasse of modernism. Its relevance is determined also by the fact that a more “eclectic” and “organic” vision of the world

is gradually taking shape—as in analogous periods in the past (the mannerist architecture of the 16th century may serve as an example)—on the basis of the disintegration of the modernist vision. However, today’s situation is far more “serious” than the preceding periods of the predominance of eclectics and organics for it is based on the assimilation of the entire, positive and negative, experience of modernism, which has had an opportunity to manifest itself more fully than in any other era. It is for this reason that we are today dealing with post-modernism, and not with the notorious pendulum movement from an “organic” to a “mechanistic” world-vision and back.

The outward manifestations of the new consciousness which is taking shape are being expressed, first, in the replacement of the tendency toward mass character, giantism, unification, standardization, structure and synchronism by a tendency toward individuality, “compartmentalization,” diversity, self-expression of the individual and diachronism and, second, in the replacement of the “heroic” tendency toward total transformation, one-time solutions, absolute truth, “consistency” and utopia by a tendency toward gradualness, careful consideration, multivariance and pluralism, diversity in communication and development and cautiousness when interfering in complex and not completely cognizable reality.

In Western countries the democratic prospect corresponding to this new vision of the world may in practice mean the decentralization and pluralization of power; the state’s limited interference in the affairs of society and the citizens, a strengthening of legal guarantees and the assurance of a certain minimum wherewithal necessary for a civilized existence; people’s actual participation in the management of production; the formation of a social climate supporting comprehensive, carefully considered reforms aimed at the further liberation and self-expression of the individual; a restructuring of forces of the left based on a rejection of doctrinal “consistency” and a reorientation toward the principles of “eclecticism”; the maximally variegated composition of equal social and political forces pursuing maximally “eclectic” democratic goals.

The main ideological frontier which has to be taken is the surmounting of modernist ideas concerning the differences between “left” and “right”. On the left flank values of “equality” have completely replaced the original demand for the democratization of society. However, even these values of “equality” have atrophied as a result of the statization of society and the individual. And the entire set of ideas connected with “freedom” as a value has proven to be the property of the “right”. The post-modernist critics have been accommodated there also. The future, meanwhile, belongs to a set of values which are formed by “freedom,” “self-expression of the individual” and “solidarity”.

In the West the very traditions of democracy are working for the establishment of the post-modernist political



vision. The modernists failed to understand that democracy is essentially post-modernist. Democracy is not a structure, even less a mechanism, but a process. It cannot be "introduced" once for all; it is the way of life and activity of tremendous, extremely diverse masses of citizens and a mode of the constant ascertainment at community level of all current interests, requirements and values. It is not a reduction to the "general" but a constant ascent thereto from the "particular".

In other words, modernism in the West, having in its time done that which was progressive of which it was capable, has exhausted itself in natural-historical fashion. As a result the Western prospect of democratization is the unfolding of a post-modernist world-vision appearing as the natural and legitimate heir of modernism.

Things are far more complex in East Europe. Here modernism, lacking outside control, has been unable to tackle the tasks confronting it (the purging of medieval trash and the creation of mechanisms for the unfolding of the process of democracy). Where to find a way out of the current situation? In the use of existing prerequisites. First, we must make use of the opportunities contained in the "authentically" Marxist world-vision: in Marx, the young Marx particularly, the modernist spirit coexists in principle with the post-modernist ideal of the community of free individuals. Second, it is essential to turn to the experience of the premodernist self-organization of society, which may be used to stimulate the self-organization of the civil society. The third prerequisite is associated with the fact that in the Europe, united in spirit, which is emerging in the West the set of values of post-modernism is flowing—on the basis of its own and observed experience—into the East European consciousness as adequate to today's stage of the development of European civilization.

The third prerequisite is of particular significance. The point being that in East Europe the establishment of post-modernism is possible only in the course of the accomplishment of the tasks which in the past remained unaccomplished by modernism and which are impeding further development. Politically this means renunciation of the mythological rubbish implanted in the guise of Marxism which views each phenomenon in accordance with "eternal" texts (in the style of medieval consciousness). Without scholastic references to texts and "principles" and on the basis of a collation of all-European values, which already exist in the mass consciousness, a platform of the Declaration of Independence or Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (with regard for the specifics of individual societies and stages of their development) could be formulated. It may be assumed that the rooting of post-modernist tendencies in the East European consciousness would create guarantees against a new hypertrophy of the modernist approach—following implementation of this operation. Post-modernist, and not modernist, shoots would most likely emerge in the spot cleared by the declaration. The core of East European democratization would be the return of the significance of

the individual and the realization that the whole is not an expression of a monolithic essence but the result of the democratic procedure of the ascertainment and concordance of the entire gamut of existing interests. And this means not only the introduction of self-management in the civil society and all political rights and possibilities in the political society without exception. It means primarily the de-ideologization and desacralization of the state at the new twist of the development spiral and man's liberation from servile dependence on the products of his own consciousness and reverence for fetishized and institutionalized ideas. And, of course, the surmounting of the purely declarative propositions recognizing the superiority of one system to another and recognition of the incorporation of East European society in European civilization.

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### Cuban Missile Crisis: Case Study in Crisis Management

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[Article by Sergey Vladislavovich Chugrov, candidate of  
historical sciences, deputy chief editor of MEMO:  
"Political Reefs of the Caribbean Crisis"]

[Text]

*In the final days of January of this year a tripartite symposium on problems of the Caribbean crisis was held in a private Moscow residence on Leninskiy Prospekt. It was organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO and the Soviet Political Sciences Association with the support of the Soviet Peace Foundation for the purpose of the continued exchange of opinions on this subject which began between Soviet and American delegations last year in Harvard. The Moscow meeting brought together at a roundtable for the first time delegations of the three parties which were involved in the impetuous maelstrom of events of the "hot October" of 1962. We publish material which analyzes the basic directions and centers of debate which unfolded at the symposium.*

One experiences an odd feeling when what might have been just about to happen, but did not, is being discussed. Although more than 26 years have elapsed, our ignorance or half-knowledge and deliberate or unconscious distortions of history compel us to return once again to the events of 1962. Having run into the Caribbean political reefs, the line of political development then turned abruptly aside, forcing political scientists—only mentally now, unfortunately—to draw dotted versions of the possible continuation.

It is no less important, in my view, to understand now—from the height of our capacities for self-analysis—the currents and hidden political whirlpools, accidents and outright absurdities which were inexorably



involving the world in catastrophe. How unique was this interweaving of the objective and subjective? Can we speak of a "Caribbean model" of crisis development? Is a repeat coincidence of political vectors capable of leading to such a situation conceivable?

Political science can hardly be accused of a lack of interest in these questions over the two and one-half decades. But it is only now, perhaps, that a new level of candor and analysis has become possible. Why? First, the very passage of time is washing away the dams of secrecy. But what is more important is something else—mankind is thinking in different categories, and our glasnost is making it possible to step across the bad "we-do-not-speak-about-this" tradition, across the political prohibitions and partialities of past decades. And, finally, that same inexorable course of time is forcing us to make haste: although the two coproducers of the significant events—N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy—can no longer ever sit at the same table, many other members of the "crews," without excuses for complaining about a poor memory or illness, can—to mutual satisfaction—put together a picture from scattered, at times odd, fragments.

I will say right away that the contours of these fragments fit one another far from ideally. In fact until now there have been three sketches—Soviet, American and Cuban—each of which has been distinguished by its own style, temperament and coloring. What is being compiled now, however—albeit not a full one as yet—is a portrait of the events in which one is not struck by the variety of styles.

For 2 days I went into the crisis and emerged therefrom together with its participants, witnesses and "biographers". That the political epicenter of the crisis of the fall of 1962 was represented at the meeting you may judge from the list of delegates and their positions at that time: USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador in Washington, and A.I. Alekseyev, USSR ambassador in Havana. Acting the part of witnesses party to the development of events in the "inner sanctum" of Soviet policy of those years were the sons of the then leaders S.N. Khrushchev and S.A. Mikoyan, who, as is known, although "they did not have their finger on the button," were attentive and not impartial observers. The American participants in and witnesses to those events (I indicate once again their offices at that time) were Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, the President's national security adviser, Theodore Sorensen, special presidential assistant, Gen William Smith, deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Group, and White House Press Secretary Pierre Sorensen (sic).

Speaking of the Cuban delegation, we should mention first of all Jorge Valdes Risquet, member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, who headed the delegation, Rafael Hernandez, then chief of the Cuban General Staff, and Sergio del Valle Jimenez,

one of Fidel's closest comrades in arms who was at the source of the Cuban revolution.

The symposium's think tank consisted of eminent historians and political scientists. They included G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, Ye.M. Primakov, G.A. Arbatov, V.V. Zhurkin, O.N. Bykov, A.K. Kislov, D.A. Volkogonov, F.M. Burlatskiy and other scholars. American intellectual potential was represented by such names as Raymond Garthoff, Joseph Nye, Graham Ellison, James Blight and others.

So all three parties had come together at one table to discuss the situation of strict confrontation which had taken shape in the fall of 1962. Given any seating arrangement at the debating table, the delegations inevitably found themselves side by side. Perhaps this was symbolic: there would have been no insane brinkmanship had the most controversial issues been tackled thus.

In order that the discussion might be conducted as sincerely as possible the participants agreed to forgo the partial and vigilant "supervision" of the press. They were hardly all completely sincere to a man—prejudice was still very substantial, and the cautiousness familiar to all of us was too deeply rooted. But the level of friendly confidentiality and lack of constraint achieved at the meeting nonetheless makes it possible to speak of a fundamentally new state of both political consciousness and our new knowledge concerning the Caribbean crisis. Respecting the endeavor of the participants in this "sentimental journey" into the past to preserve the demagnetized nature of thought and complete freedom of self-expression, we also should remove the quotation marks from the quotations, observing in a number of cases the anonymity of the statements. At least to the extent that this reflects the desire of the participants in the debate themselves and until a stenographic report of the symposium has been prepared for the press.

### Genesis of the Crisis

There is no doubt that the sources of the crisis go back to mutual misunderstanding and the misinterpretation of one another's intentions. However much the Americans may reiterate, hand on Bible, that they had no intention of mounting a massive invasion of Cuba, their actual actions indicated precisely the opposite. What were these actions?

Primarily the events which occurred 17-19 April 1961 as a result of the landing of counterrevolutionary mercenaries near the inhabited locality of Playa Hiron in the Bay of Pigs. The operation was carried out under the cover of the U.S. armed forces. Finally, certain congressmen voiced unconcealed threats against Cuba.

It is worth stopping to think: all these points have for a long time been the fulcrum of the Soviet excuses for the deployment of missiles on Cuba, have they not. Yes, but a certain paradox of the present situation is the fact that

they are today being enumerated by the American participant in the events. And he is concluding that had he been the Cuban leader, he himself would have expected an American landing.

Thus does time put everything in its place. But has it taken almost three decades to learn to put oneself in the place of others? The essence of the situation, however, lies elsewhere: I would very much like to believe the Americans at the top of the pyramid of power in 1962 when they say that at that time the U.S. leaders did not have "the least intention" of attacking Cuba (there was, of course, understandably, a "gentleman's set" of operational plans drawn up by the military). And had an absence of aggressive intentions shown through in some way on the Potomac, history would, perhaps, have taken shape differently. But perhaps not: so high was the level of mutual suspicion and mistrust.

As far as the situation which had taken shape at the start of the 1960's around Cuba is concerned, the list of demonstrations of hostility toward the Cuban people's choice could include also Cuba's diplomatic isolation on the continent, its expulsion from the Organization of American States and the establishment of an economic blockade on the part of the United States. Cuba would add to this list also the continued recruitment in the United States of soldiers of Cuban origin, naval maneuvers off the island's shores and the practicing of an assault landing (such a rehearsal was staged by the Americans on Puerto Rico). We did not know where and when the invasion would be at that time, a member of the Cuban delegation emphasized, but we were unequivocally sure that it would take place.

So there is the answer to the question "why?" it would seem. But this is only part of the explanation of why Soviet missiles appeared on Cuba.

The missile crisis may be understood only in a strategic context, perhaps. The United States had a very substantial superiority to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. According to the testimony of R. McNamara, which is quite widely known and which was heard once again at the symposium, it constituted 17:1 (approximately 5,000 weapons for the United States, approximately 300 for the USSR). But granted all this, the former defense secretary maintains, the Kennedy administration was not looking at the possibility of launching a first strike. Whether this be the case or not is not now, fortunately, of vital importance. What is important is the acknowledgment made by the Americans that the Soviet Union had reason to believe (even if mistaken reason, taking risks in such cases is impermissible) that Washington was prepared to launch an attack.

Our country's nuclear authority was so negligible that we were not even reckoned with. In any event, this was precisely how the situation was perceived in Moscow and simply could not have been perceived otherwise. Whence, in my view, the perfectly obvious desire to even up the balance. And whereas in 1962 the correlation of

forces in terms of nuclear weapons constituted 17:1 in favor of the United States, it should be recalled that a few years earlier it could have been characterized as "zero to infinity". Only in 1962, according to specialists, did our first missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory appear.

Thus, it seems to me, the psychological underlying cause of the situation is understandable: both the sense of limitation and the temptation to let the United States feel the vulnerability of its territory and demonstrate the new Soviet possibilities (in other words, to employ the expression attributed to Khrushchev himself—to "put a hedgehog in the Americans' pants") played their part.

It was for this purpose that R-12 missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km were delivered to Cuba and that further R-14 missiles, whose range was in excess of 4,000 km, were on the way. What it is particularly important to emphasize is that at the time of the culmination of the crisis, when everything was literally hanging by a thread, **not one warhead had been fitted to the missiles.**

How did the idea of the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba first arise? There are three versions. According to one, N.S. Khrushchev first discussed the possibility of the deployment of missiles in proximity to the shores of America alone with A.I. Mikoyan at the end of April or start of May 1962.

According to another version, the idea arose in May or April during a stroll taken by N.S. Khrushchev, who was on vacation, in the company of Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky along the Crimean shore. Pointing to the horizon, the defense minister was then talking about the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Turkey. Was the missiles idea born to the sound of the breakers?

According, however, to the book "Khrushchev Remembers," which contains a wealth of information, the idea of the need to match the United States strategically would not leave the Soviet leader. If we rely on the accuracy of these memoirs, the "Cuban option" arose during the visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, and Khrushchev shared his thoughts with sympathizers among the Soviet leaders.<sup>1</sup>

Whatever the details, all the versions, it would seem to me, amount to the fact that the idea arose in April-May 1962 and was initially considered within a select group. Among N.S. Khrushchev's associates who discussed the plan were, according to a participant in the symposium, A.I. Mikoyan and F.R. Kozlov, members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium, and also A.A. Gromyko, R.Ya. Malinovsky and Marshal S.S. Biryuzov, who not long prior to this had been appointed commander of strategic missile forces. A.I. Alekseyev, who had been appointed ambassador to Cuba, was also enlisted in the discussion somewhat later.

The question was submitted to the Central Committee Presidium, apparently, in the first half of May. Following lengthy discussion in the Kremlin, as the witnesses related, many members of the Presidium visited N.S. Khrushchev at home and, behind closed doors, argued to the point of exhaustion.

The decision to deploy missiles on Cuba was not, to judge by everything, made easily. The circumstances were considered and analyzed from various aspects. The purpose of the deployment of the missiles was to curb aggression against Cuba, but, naturally, the Soviet leadership could not have failed to have considered possible changes in the strategic situation.

The Soviet leadership's decision-making was usually collective, but certain personal traits of N.S. Khrushchev could not have failed to have made their mark on the discussion—the certain authoritarian and peremptory nature of his opinions, primarily. As observed at the symposium, many members of the leadership preferred to withhold their objections. Khrushchev knew how to insist on having his way—this had both pluses and minuses. If the Caribbean crisis is judged by its consequences, the minuses of such a style were reflected in the period of maturation of the crisis, when the decision on the secret deployment of “nonoffensive weapons” was adopted, and the pluses, at the time of decisive withdrawal from the state of confrontation.

In those May days of 1962 O.V. Kuusinen, after some hesitation, supported the plan in the course of the debate. Later other members of the Presidium supported it also. To judge by one description, A.I. Mikoyan voiced two reservations. He expressed doubts that, first, F. Castro would agree to accept the missiles and, second, that it would not be possible to deploy them in concealment from the United States. N.S. Khrushchev then proposed sending S.S. Biryuzov to Cuba to clarify the circumstances.

The delegation, headed by Sh.R. Rashidov, candidate of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and consisting mainly of agriculture specialists, arrived in Cuba. The inclusion therein of the taciturn “engineer Petrov” lent the whole story a detective-novel character almost. Having been appointed ambassador, but not as yet having had time to have been accepted, A.I. Alekseyev asked Raul Castro to present the “engineer” to the Cuban leadership. He understood everything, and Marshal S.S. Biryuzov was received.

Contrary to A.I. Mikoyan's misgivings, F. Castro, to judge from the stories of eyewitnesses, did not reject the idea of deployment of the missiles out of hand but gave it cordial attention and promised to think it over.

After the Soviet proposal had been made, F. Castro assembled the six leaders who were members of the party Central Committee Secretariat and outlined the situation. According to the Cubans, the proposal was approved unanimously. It was perceived at once as a method of changing the correlation of forces between

socialism and capitalism. Returning to Moscow, Biryuzov allegedly informed Khrushchev not only of Havana's consent but also that the missiles could be deployed secretly. But the symposium heard also the opposite version—in defense of the honor of the departed S.S. Biryuzov—to the effect that his report said nothing about secrecy. Khrushchev was himself carried away by this idea.

The Cuban leadership proposed that the understanding which had been reached be widely proclaimed. But at the time of his visit to Moscow in July 1962 Raul Castro was told by the Soviet leader “no”. Cuba did not insist, recognizing that the Soviet side was better informed and could therefore adopt a considered decision.

The crisis inevitably approached.

### Development and Culmination of the Crisis

The increased military activity on Cuba was noted both in speeches on Capitol Hill and in the American press. But it was only on 14 October with the aid of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft that photographs of missile bases on Cuba which opened Americans' eyes to the true essence of what was going on were obtained. Prior to these photographs being obtained, the CIA believed that “the Soviets were installing air-defense missiles with a range of 25 miles.” On 16 October the photographic evidence was handed to President Kennedy.

On 18 October 1962 the President received A.A. Gromyko in the Oval Office. During the conversation, following a number of caustic remarks, the President gave the assurance that the United States had no intention of invading Cuba. He plainly acknowledged that the landing in the Bay of Pigs had been a mistake. But the question of the Soviet missiles, which was evidently gnawing at the minds of the two partners, was not raised. Neither of them ventured to touch on this painful abscess. Why? After all, photographs of the missile installations were in a drawer in the President's desk.

A.A. Gromyko explained at the symposium that J. Kennedy did not put a direct question concerning the missiles and that had such a question been put, the President would have received a fitting answer. Here, perhaps, is a most complex psychological hitch of the entire political situation of that time testifying to how long a road has been traveled from mistrust and total secrecy to the mutual inspections of military facilities in our day....

As observed at the Moscow symposium, the fact of the deployment of the Soviet missiles close by the United States caused something akin to shock in some members of the American Administration. As R. McNamara acknowledged, estimating in 1961 what the Soviet armed forces would be like in 7 years (in 1968), American strategists were oriented toward the “possibilities of the Soviets,” and not their intentions. But it occurred to no one to analyze the possibilities of the appearance of Soviet missiles off America's shores.

As is well known from the numerous descriptions of the crisis development, the chronological chain of events was as follows. On 22 October President Kennedy spoke on the radio, stunning Americans with the news of the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba. The U.S. Navy had been ordered to establish a "quarantine" (a diplomatic euphemism for the "blockade" concept) around Cuba to prevent the passage of supply ships carrying offensive types of arms. As Soviet sources confirm, the original impulsive response to the blockade of Cuba's shores was the decision to ignore it and put the blame for the possible use of force on the United States. However, this decision, which was fraught with the danger of the most unpredictable consequences, was shortly after canceled.

What, however, was the main reason for the hard-line, categorical reaction of the White House, which left extremely few opportunities for diplomatic maneuver? Primarily, the Americans claim, the very strong tradition of resistance to any non-American weapons in the Western hemisphere, which goes back to the fundamentals of national ideas concerning security. The country's public opinion, they believe, would never have reconciled itself to foreign missiles on Cuba.

Washington's turbulent reaction to the Soviet missiles was also explained by the fact that their deployment had been carried out under the cover of the strictest secrecy. It is surprising, but it seemed to me that when R. McNamara, M. Bundy, Gen W. Smith and other Americans broached this delicate subject, there came to be heard in their voices, besides an assured-accusatory tone, puzzled and confused intonations. Like a person who has a grudge against he knows not what. Yes, the American plans in respect to the missiles deployed in Turkey or Italy were entirely open and public. But the Soviet Union had transported and assembled its missiles clandestinely and in secret. It was not a feeling of fear but a sense of having been deceived, it would seem, which had at that time "thrown" the Americans to the greatest extent. A highly original and at first sight paradoxical method of solving the problem of secrecy was modeled at the symposium by the Americans: you could have introduced the weapons secretly, but should have notified Kennedy of this. This is only apparently paradoxical. Alas, it is merely acclimatization to the rules of the new thinking which is showing that openness is beneficial, while secrecy and deception sometimes entail inconceivable costs.

Why, then, the veil of secrecy over the missiles? The rational explanation, which I heard from our side, was that it would not have been possible to carry out this action openly at all and that political benefits would thereby have been let slip. One further reason for the secrecy and the silences was the specifics of the domestic political situation in the United States: the country was on the threshold of mid-term elections. Naturally, the Soviet leaders could not, as the symposium observed, have failed to have foreseen that the negative reaction of the White House and Congress to the deployment of the missiles would have to have been multiplied by the

intensity of election passions and for this reason endeavored to drag out the "latent period" of the preparations. According to a participant in the symposium, G.N. Bolshakov, former member of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and chief editor of the journal SOVIET LIFE, a verbal message from N.S. Khrushchev to President J. Kennedy conveyed on the eve of the crisis communicated the fact that the "Soviet leaders well understand President Kennedy's position, will not engage in any actions in respect of the United States before the 1962 congressional elections and hope that when the elections are over we will embark on a new round of active negotiations."

Thus the secret was temporary and, of course, could not have been kept for long. And, after all, in any version—secret or open—Americans' reaction to the deployment of the missiles would have been essentially the same. It could only be a question of differences in the emotional coloration and "temperature" of this reaction. I would recall once again that the Soviet leadership was sure that there would be an invasion of Cuba. And what in that case would have awaited the Cubans if the restraining factor had been missing, and an invasion had begun?

That's how it all was. However, in my view, the analysis of the Caribbean crisis made at the symposium from the height of our present-day knowledge and experience testifies that the negative consequences of the secret nature of the operation were immeasurably in excess of the positive results which were obtained. The attempt to keep the deployment of the missile launchers secret was, I am certain, not only politically dangerous but also doomed to fail. Naturally, the Americans could not fail to have been alerted by the increase in the number of supply ships which were crossing the ocean. N.S. Khrushchev and many others saw as the reason for the exposure of the secret intention precisely the sharp increase in the supply ship convoys. But it was not this, it would seem to me, which was the main reason. According to the American scholar R. Garthoff, by the time the "quarantine" had been imposed, there were 16 Soviet ships en route to Cuba's shores, and only 7 of them were carrying in their holds missile components and equipment for their installation. The attention of American intelligence, to judge by everything, had been attracted primarily by the construction work under way on the island.

True, despite the availability of reconnaissance facilities, Washington seriously underestimated the dimensions of the Soviet presence on Cuba. According to an official estimate of American intelligence, the numbers of Soviet servicemen there had grown from 4,500 men, according to the figures for 3 October, to 8,000-10,000 by 22 October and to 12,000-16,000 by 19 November 1962. According to retrospective estimates made at the start of 1963, at the time of the culmination of the crisis there were 22,000 Soviet servicemen on Cuba. These figures are surprisingly far from the true figures. There were on the island at that time 40,000-42,000 Soviet soldiers and officers.

Whence this huge error in the estimates? Helping explain this was the answer to a question put at the symposium by the Americans, who inquired after the kind of "linkup" there had been Soviet and Cuban forces at the tensest moment of the crisis. American intelligence reported on 27 October in the area of deployment of the Soviet installations a buildup of Cuban forces had been observed and that there had been some kind of disorder, which was assessed as a clash. In actual fact, as a Soviet participant in the meeting recounted, two soldiers had been to blame for a compartment of a munitions store blowing up. The troops had to be assembled urgently to liquidate the consequences of the explosion. Some Soviet soldiers were wearing Cuban uniform. There were, naturally, no clashes. But the account of the incident elucidates to a considerable extent the reasons for the American mistake in its estimate of the numbers of the Soviet contingent.

Miscalculations, wrong assessments and mistaken interpretations of the parties' intentions multiplied by the factors of fear and shortage of time led to the crisis threatening to slip completely out of control and acquire irrational features. Despite the fact that the parties' daily contacts and consultations had by Friday, 26 October reached the highest level, on Saturday, it was mutually recognized, the crisis reached its apogee. Reports reached Washington that the tanker "Groznyy" was heading toward the blockade line. And following it, even more menacing news: a U-2 reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba.

How had this happened? (An interesting detail, incidentally: the Soviet ambassador to Cuba at that time learned the details of the incident only 15 years later). According to participants in the events, Fidel Castro had given an order for all military aircraft which appeared over the island's territory to be shot down without warning. The order dealt, understandably, with low-flying aircraft and, besides, it could not have extended to Soviet units. Nonetheless, the appearance in the skies of a U-2 aircraft caught our command unawares: it was approaching and within 2 minutes would be within range—to shoot it down or not? The telephone did not help solve the problem, Gen I. Pliyev was not there at the right moment, and a lightning choice had to be made. Two missiles were fired. The aircraft was shot down by the first missile. A telegram was received in the morning of 28 October from Marshal Malinovskiy. The point thereof was that the shooting down of the aircraft had been hasty and that a peaceful solution had been possible. It is known also that N.S. Khrushchev was upset by the incident and considered it a mistake.

Why has so much attention been paid in arguments and debates to this episode? First, it was, possibly, a most dangerous moment of the crisis. And, second, the incident became overgrown with fabrications and myths. Specifically, the opinion that the aircraft had been shot down by the Cubans was widespread. Subsequently this version came to acquire quite grotesque outlines. Assertions appeared and were quoted by the press repeatedly

that "Fidel himself pressed the button". Although the Cuban leader knows how to use weapons pretty well, he physically lacked the opportunity to do this. According to Cuban participants in the events, he was in Havana, whereas the aircraft had been shot down in the east of the country. As a whole, however, the version is groundless if only because the Cubans did not in principle have the appropriate missiles. The reaction of Fidel Castro to this step was, it was unanimously maintained, positive.

Some of the Americans' remarks on their state of mind at the time of the culmination of the crisis portray the serious intensity of passions. The general mood was such: war was about to begin. "As a result on Saturday, 27 October 1962 the crisis had reached a point where, we were told, two persons from the Central Committee had decided to take their wives and children out of town in expectation of an American nuclear attack on Moscow," R. McNamara recalled in his statement for the press. "And at the same time in Washington it was a fine fall evening when I left the President's office to return to the Pentagon, and I thought that I might not see the next Saturday evening. I know that this sounds melodramatic, but it reflects the state of the participants on both sides at this peak moment of the crisis."

Fuel was added to the fire by the rumor that the Soviet Embassy in the United States was burning its papers. Was this in fact the case? A.F. Dobrynin authoritatively refuted this: no, papers were not burned. But contingency preparations were made, meetings were held and precautionary measures were discussed.

On the whole, neither party, naturally, expected the deliberate start of nuclear war. But, first, it was absolutely unclear where an escalation of the crisis could lead. And, besides, an accident could not be ruled out ("theoretically," as a participant in the discussion put it, "there is always an idiot who has not been notified"). The acute sense of alarm in Moscow was determined by the expectation that the United States could invade Cuba within a few hours. This was confirmed by both information from Havana and intelligence data. Indeed, as was ascertained much later, in the morning of 27 October the President gave the instruction for the preparation of a possible attack on Cuba by 30 October in the event of diplomatic efforts proving unsuccessful.<sup>2</sup>

As a former representative of the top echelon of the American command recounted at the symposium, the preparations at that time proceeded along two lines. First, there was a buildup of combat aviation forces for the possible bombing of the positions of the Soviet missile installations, that is, a kind of preventive strike was being prepared. Second, a number of U.S. Army units and subunits were redeployed in a southerly direction, that is, the possibility of an invasion by forces of several divisions with air cover was anticipated. Naturally, there was debate in the military establishment concerning the choice of option, in which "hawks" and "doves" participated. The proposal that tactical nuclear weapons be attached to the invasion group was expressed

even (the question of warheads for the Honest John was not realistic, R. McNamara, who maintained that he would never have consented to this, testified).

What was happening in Cuba at the time of the culmination of events? According to Fidel Castro's associates, accelerated preparations to beat off the aggression were under way, 270,000 men had been mobilized, positions had been taken up and the terrain had been prepared—Cuba was ready to resist "not 3 days and not 3 months but until the last soldier." Possible losses could have been of the order of 100,000 men. The Soviet soldiers also, members of the Cuban delegation emphasized, were prepared to die weapon in hand. Following the announcement of the decision on the dismantling of the missiles, they related, the Soviet and Cuban soldiers embraced and wept.

As already mentioned, the rapid growth of the seriousness of the crisis coincided with the peak of the parties' efforts to settle it. Three forms of communications were in operation. First, telegrams signed by Kennedy and Khrushchev (they were duplicated via both embassies); second, unsigned messages which had been conveyed in oral form; third, a variety of comment. The antediluvian method which was employed by our embassy at that time for communication with Moscow is perceived with a bitter smile now: when the coded message was ready, we called Western Union, a negro on a bicycle would arrive, and he was handed a package, being urged on virtually when he set off back to the agency. Generally, "nervous strain".... How can we not recall here that 8 months prior to the crisis it had been proposed to organize a "hot line"!

The Soviet ambassador's personal contacts with Robert Kennedy performed an important positive role. Confidential verbal messages were conveyed via this channel. As of 23 October, such meetings took place practically every day—both within the embassy and in R. Kennedy's office in the Justice Department. They sometimes went on until 1 or 2 in the morning, and morning meetings were held also. The personal liaison of embassy staff with American politicians and journalists was activated in parallel.

A message from N.S. Khrushchev to the President was received in Washington on 26 October. It arrived in portions from 6 until 9 in the evening. It contained agreement to dismantle the missiles on Cuba in exchange for the United States' guaranteed undertaking to henceforward renounce any plans to invade Cuba. In the White House, the Americans related, everyone breathed a sigh of relief, understanding that a foundation for extrication from the quagmire of the crisis had been found. But on the Saturday morning of 27 October, when a positive response to Moscow had been prepared, a second "Khrushchev letter" was received, this raising the question of the American missiles deployed in Turkey. The difference in the tone of the messages was striking: the first was emotional, excited, the second, balanced, firmer.

As the American participants in the events of October 1962 maintained, the demand for the inclusion of the question of the dismantling of the "Turkish missiles" in the package of conditions for settlement of the crisis put the White House in an awkward position. As observed at the symposium, the U.S. Administration believed that the missiles in Turkey (and Italy) represented a source of crises and were, in any event, planning to dismantle them. However, the President did not consider it possible to decide this matter in isolation, without coordination with the allies. A promise was therefore made (via R. Kennedy) that the missiles would be withdrawn from Turkey within several months after the settlement of the crisis, but outside of the official package of accords. This decision evidently satisfied both parties. The problem of the "Turkish missiles" did not become a stumbling block, nor was it central in the settlement. This question, an American participant in the crisis events stated plainly, was resolved independently, and not as part of the negotiations on the Cuban crisis. However, the tactical linkage of the questions concerning the missiles on Cuba and in Turkey subsequently afforded a pretext for assumptions that the Soviet Union had deployed its missiles in proximity to the United States to subsequently "exchange" them for the American ones. These assumptions are, as we can see, without foundation.

Why was it that Cuba did not take part in the lightning settlement negotiations? Sitting in soft armchairs, we may now leisurely consider this and compare facts. At the time when both Havana and Moscow were expecting a possible invasion in a matter of hours, only rapid and unambiguous steps in the direction of a solution ("fleeing the crisis"! ) were needed. The White House, for its part, ruled out the possibility of direct negotiations with Havana inasmuch as "the missiles were controlled by the Soviets, and not the Cubans." As an American participant in the events explained, the United States had been conducting the negotiations without its allies and expected Moscow to do the same.

But, to judge by everything, the Cubans still have a bitterish aftertaste on account of the fact that they were not invited to participate in the settlement. Yes, Cuba might have had an opportunity for fuller satisfaction of its demands like the removal of American military patrol craft from Puerto Rico, for example, the lifting of the economic blockade and the return of Guantanamo. It might have been, probably, if all the parties involved in the conflict had had such an ally as time. But, alas, they did not.

On the "Black Saturday" of 27 October no one either in Washington or in Moscow knew how subsequent events might turn out. While the White House was awaiting Khrushchev's return reaction, preparations for a strike against Cuba continued. And, as American sources maintain, Kennedy had not in those agonizing hours of waiting made the decision whether there would or would not be an invasion in the event of Moscow refusing to accept the American compromise version. Only comparatively recently has it become known that the President

was mulling over the possibility of a further concession on the question of the missiles in Turkey in the course of diplomatic negotiations.<sup>3</sup>

Khrushchev's response was made public within literally a few hours together with the announcement of the order to dismantle the launchers on Cuba. Peace was preserved. The Caribbean crisis was over, growth into an armed confrontation having been avoided.

### Lessons of the Crisis

All the phases of the Caribbean crisis—its origin, development, culmination and resolution—are highly instructive from the viewpoint of the present day. M.S. Gorbachev observed in his message to the participants in the symposium that "study of the mechanisms of the emergence of crisis situations of such a kind and also the ways of their political and diplomatic settlement remains topical, particularly under conditions where the new political thinking is meeting with an ever wider response and practical application in world affairs." In a sense the new thinking itself is a product of the quest for a system of states' relations which prevents the emergence of crisis situations.

In order to derive practicable lessons from the Caribbean crisis it is necessary to understand first of all how close mankind came at that time to the nuclear abyss.

On the question of the degree of reality of nuclear catastrophe the opinions of the participants differed. And among the Soviet delegation also a whole spectrum of opinions was represented—from total denial of the risk of nuclear war to the unambiguous acknowledgment that the world was on the threshold of such a confrontation.

As observed in the course of the discussion, Khrushchev was at that time bluffing: "we are making missiles like sausages." The nuclear test explosion of colossal power on Novaya Zemlya may be attributed to this series of demonstrations also. Carried away by the opportunities which were opening up, the country, against its will, perhaps, was becoming involved in the "witch's wheel" of the power game, Academician G.A. Arbatov observed.

It should be remembered that the level of political analysis at that time was still very low. Few people realized how high the stakes in this game were. How would events have unfolded had the Soviet missile not shot down a reconnaissance aircraft but destroyed a ship? Or if the President Kennedy tragedy had occurred a year earlier? If N.S. Khrushchev had taken his "deserved retirement" not in October 1964 but in October 1962? How many such "if's" could be listed.... The essence of this viewpoint is: "it is necessary not to be one step away from catastrophe but to run right away from it."

Another opinion was that the question of the rightness or mistaken nature of the deployment of the missiles is altogether incorrect. Hardly anyone is capable of answering it, just as in the majority of cases when it is a

question of prophecies about the past. If the United States was obviously not harboring any intention of invading Cuba, the deployment of the missiles could definitely be classified as a mistake. But who at that time had the opportunity to unambiguously interpret the intentions of the other side? This is the first thing.

Second, all actions are always evaluated in terms of their results. And the solution of the Caribbean crisis was accompanied by positive results, on the whole. I shall reduce them to the simplest outline: following the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles, Cuba obtained security guarantees, and the American nuclear missiles in Turkey were dismantled. But the main thing, I believe, was not even this. As observed at the symposium, there are perfectly correct grounds for supposing that, had the Caribbean crisis not occurred, the danger of nuclear war would in the subsequent period have been higher. Thus the Caribbean crisis may be considered a kind of vaccination and shot against nuclear confrontation. The strict precaution is, as we can see, holding good today even.

The majority of participants in the discussion approved the figurative comparison with vaccination, seemingly. But it ran into a no less metaphorical comparison: is an injection with a dirty needle carrying the risk of passing on the AIDS infection conceivable?

The conclusion was, for all that, unequivocal: playing with fire is undoubtedly dangerous, and it would have been better for all had the crisis not assumed such threatening proportions and seriousness. But, as the participants in the discussion observed, in 1962 the nuclear confrontation did not threaten mankind's existence. A different situation has taken shape in the 1970's-1980's, when nuclear palisades have appeared on the planet. There is therefore reason to maintain that the Caribbean crisis taught caution and prudence in the treatment of so fragile a political reality as the balance of interests.

However, even in the initial period following the Caribbean crisis, when the shock from the danger which had been experienced had not yet passed, far from all American politicians realized that mankind was in a new situation. The majority of Americans undoubtedly felt tremendous relief and welcomed the wisdom of the leaders of the two powers. There was a group of critics on the left (they came to be called "revisionist historians") maintaining that the President should have been held responsible for the crisis and the danger to which the nation had been subjected. They accused Kennedy of having been insufficiently active in the search for political paths of a settlement. A group of critics on the right consisting mainly of figures of the preceding administration called the Soviet-American accords a "sell-out agreement," pouring on Kennedy their spite for the fact that he had not allowed an invasion of Cuba. These "hawks" were opposed to a peaceful settlement at that time and even today they are not reconciled to the existence of socialist Cuba. Although there have not been since 1962 such acute situations, the power blackmail to which



Washington has resorted in the last quarter-century, the aggression against Grenada, the provocations against Libya, the confrontation actions in the Near East and many other examples confirm that there are no guarantees against a repetition of the 1962 situation.

The Soviet Union also has taken a complex path toward recognition of the mechanisms of political balance in the nuclear era. The superfluous ideological baggage which has burdened interstate relations and the not entirely delicate handling of the subtle mechanism of regional policy, which developed, for example, into the ill-considered decision on a military-force version of an approach to the complex Afghan situation—this is evidence of an insufficiently responsible understanding of the relationship of regional and global stability. For this reason, evidently, it is so important to now collate the lessons of the events of 1962, which are today a canonical, but far from completely studied example of the headlong growth of a regional into a global crisis.

The basic lessons of the Caribbean crisis comprehended from the standpoints of the present-day world situation were formulated by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, who presided at the discussion of this topic. They amount in the form of propositions to the following six points:

given the current level of armaments, states must not count on the achievement of military superiority;

political pressure and a show of strength cannot be seen as methods for states' achievement of their goals;

an aspiration to possess a "monopoly on action," in other words, denial of the other side the right to an adequate response, is fraught today with dangerous consequences for peace;

an attempt to view regional situations through the prism of global confrontation not only destabilizes the situation in the world but excludes the possibility of a settlement of regional conflicts;

it is essential to de-ideologize interstate relations inasmuch as dislike of an ideological and political kind, becoming the dominant factor in these relations, turns into a threat to peace;

the danger of confrontation grows considerably given an absence of normal contacts between countries and peoples.

As a whole, the quintessence of these conclusions is such: reliably safeguarding security now is possible only by political means, reliance on military-power methods having been renounced.

A significant place in the discussion was occupied by an analysis also of many lessons of a more particular nature. These included, for example, the role of accidents, misinterpretation of the other side's intentions, disinformation and irrational factors, which cannot be properly evaluated and analyzed under the conditions of the severe shortage of time when a crisis is escalating. We

may mention as an example the not-unknown O. Penkovskiy, who is frequently called "possibly the most successful Western secret agent of those who operated in the Soviet Union."<sup>4</sup> The information which he transmitted to the West was considered there highly valuable for an analysis of the data of a photo survey of the deployment of Soviet missile installations. Nonetheless, M. Bundy believed, the "Penkovskiy factor" played no in any way pronounced and, even less, strategic part in the Caribbean crisis. But the following detail is food for thought: before his arrest, he was able to send a visual signal from his apartment. However, as the American political scientist R. Garthoff recounted at the symposium, Penkovskiy became confused and gave in his panic, instead of the signal for failure, a sign signifying the Soviet Union's readiness to launch a strike against the United States. This signal, fortunately, was evaluated by the Americans as false, and even the director of the CIA was not notified. But it is a typical example of a situation which could have played a fatal part for mankind and compels reflection on the possible tragic chain of accidents. We can imagine a confluence of circumstances when the exposure and arrest of Penkovskiy coincided in time with the moment of the culmination of a crisis: the interpretation of the signal could have been entirely different.

An analysis of the Caribbean crisis induces reflection also on the significance of the personal attributes of the political leaders. N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, a number of participants in the discussion believed, played a unique part in the resolution of the crisis. How would the crisis have ended had there been in their place figures who were disposed to reflection and who were less decisive? Or, on the contrary, "decisive" to the extent that they were capable of impulsive actions going beyond the framework of prudence and responsibility? In the centuries-long history of conflict the highest marks have always been earned by the politicians who have most adroitly entered into a crisis situation and emerged from it with the maximum benefits for their country. The idea of a Soviet participant in the symposium, Prof A.O. Chubaryan, would seem to be of exceptional interest in this connection: considering the imperatives of the nuclear era, it is essential to study the experience primarily of the leaders who have been most skillful in avoiding crises.

Evaluating the results of 1962, O.N. Bykov spoke of the importance of regular personal contacts between the powers' leaders. It is significant, in his opinion, that a few days prior to the opening of the symposium there was a telephone conversation between the leaders of the USSR and the United States, who sent it their greetings. As is known, there were telephone communications between the USSR and the United States in 1962, but the atmosphere of the cold war and the absence of traditions of regular dealings ruled out the possibility of recourse in a crisis situation to a direct conversation, compelling the use of traditional diplomatic channels.



In periods of crisis what is sometimes important is not so much the parties' intentions even, A.K. Kislov observed, as their correct interpretation. And for this it is necessary to expand communication and mutual contacts.

Communication should develop not only between the leading powers. Peace in the world is important not only for them but for small countries also, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov emphasized in the course of the discussion. The great powers now understand that for small countries so-called "low-intensity conflicts" are essentially high-intensity conflicts. He recalled also that any violation of small countries' sovereign rights and interests could have sorry consequences for all.

S.N. Kondrashov, political commentator of IZVESTIYA, called the attention of the participants in the symposium to the need for broader glasnost and openness in politics. Analyzing the lessons of the Caribbean crisis, one is struck by the fact that Soviet people were frightened in connection with the development of events only when it was over, as if with hindsight. The tradition of keeping secrets from one's own people even after others have disclosed it (sic) is not only immoral but harmful.

The political costs of preserving secrecy in a particular category of military questions was mentioned by V.G. Komplektov. Attempts to secretly obtain some kind of advantage over the other side are frequently fraught with complications. That the other side has to know both about the existence of weapons and how they may be used is a well-known position.

Many useful conclusions and generalizations were made in the course of the discussion. One of the main conclusions of the symposium supported by all its participants was formulated thus:

"The broad exchange of opinions has brought us—granted all the differences in views—to the common understanding that coping with a crisis which has erupted is immeasurably more difficult than preventing it. All mechanisms for de-escalating power confrontation are unreliable. And if it was at that time possible to stop at the fatal line, there is no guarantee that the outcome of a further such crisis would be just as propitious for mankind. Such a guarantee may be given only by a new way of thinking and operating excluding the possibility of the emergence of potentially uncontrollable situations. The risk of any confrontation unswervingly diminishes in the course of actual disarmament and political dialogue based on the community of interests of the survival and codevelopment of all states and peoples—large and small—with an undisputed right to independence, sovereignty and free choice of path of socioeconomic development."

And I would like to mention one further personal impression. An informal sense of coexperience was born in the roundtable discussions of the three delegations and the conversations and emotional rejoinders. Questions of the "what were you thinking at that time?" "when did you learn?" and "how did it seem to you at that time?" type made it possible to understand the

manifest and hidden motives and psychological backdrop to the decisions which were adopted at that time and to break down step by step the barriers of misunderstanding which have persisted for decades. I believe that where coexperience and an ability to put oneself in another's position appear, there can be no room for the "enemy image" and the agonizing, blind sense of terror in the face of catastrophe.

Do the results of the symposium mean that it is possible to dot the "i's" and cross the "t's" in the story of the Caribbean crisis? Obviously not. This can only be done when all the secret material of that period has been published and analyzed. Another step forward is to be taken at the next symposium, which is planned to be held in Cuba.

#### Footnotes

1. Nikita Khrushchev, "Khrushchev Remembers". Edited and translated by Strobe Talbott, vol 1, Boston, 1970, p 494.
2. See R.L. Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: the Soviet Story" (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1988, p 76).
3. See *ibid.*, pp 72-73.
4. C.E. Bohlen, "Witness to History (1929-1969), New York, 1973, p 489.

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#### 'Northern Territories' Issue in Japanese-Soviet Relations

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[Article by Georgiy Fridrikhovich Kunadze, candidate of historical sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, and Konstantin Oganessovich Sarkisov, candidate of historical sciences, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute: "Reflecting on Soviet-Japanese Relations"]

[Text]

#### I

Last December USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze paid a regular visit to Japan. Merely this simple statement highlighting the word "regular" points to a certain progress in Soviet-Japanese relations. Quite recently a trip by our foreign minister to Tokyo was a difficult political problem and was dependent on the achievement of an immediate breakthrough. When expectations exceed possibilities and each political contact is perceived as final and decisive, in other words, when utopia substitutes for realism, nothing good should be expected, and the "optimum" way out of the situation is more often than not a freezing of dialogue. We would

like to believe that all this is a thing of the past. In any event, the parties confirmed the arrangement concerning regular consultative meetings between the foreign ministers not less frequently than once a year and advocated a further broadening of contacts between politicians.

The point in the joint communique concerning M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Japan would seem extraordinarily important in the context of the general improvement in bilateral relations. The recording of this point in the communique evidently means that the parties interpret it as a mutual undertaking to create for the Soviet leader's visit the necessary conditions and believe in its capacity for achieving the set goal. Let us hope that this optimism, which even recently was lacking in Soviet-Japanese relations, will be manifested in practical steps.

There is much to be done. Virtually all spheres of relations—political, economic, treaty and legal, cultural and humanitarian ties—are in need of considerable improvement and development. For many years Soviet-Japanese relations have in fact experienced stagnation and have moved in a closed circle, not falling below the minimum reading sufficient for routine diplomatic contacts but rarely rising far above it either. This does not mean, of course, that the relations of the USSR and Japan have been a continuous sequence of failures and disappointments. It is a fact, however, that the two parties' few achievements have on each occasion been used up in the surmounting of a slump, and not in making headway. Against the background of the general recuperation of the international situation this position could not have failed to have appeared as anachronism.

The USSR and Japan are two great powers belonging to different social systems which, on account of this, bear particular responsibility not only to their own peoples but also to the peoples of friendly and allied states and all mankind. By its objective nature this type of responsibility based not only on national but also general interests is higher than calculations and particular problems of the moment, however serious they appear today. It is therefore a question of the need for a new philosophical approach, whereby both the USSR and Japan build their relations with regard for a broader historical perspective than before.

Perceiving an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as a future-oriented imperative of general development is not easy. After all, by the will of circumstances we are forced to return to the past: there is between the USSR and Japan no peace treaty which would draw a line beneath this past. The postwar period of Soviet-Japanese relations cannot as yet be considered over. The reason for this anomaly is well known—the parties' cardinal disagreements on the question of border demarcation. For a long time these disagreements were virtually glossed over in our country, and the incessant Japanese attempts to set forth their position were perceived as provocative and ill-intentioned. It is not hard to understand that the more sharply and categorically we refused to discuss our disagreements, the more they attracted the

attention of the Japanese public. The Japanese Government, which in fact made a settlement of these disagreements paramount in its relations with the USSR, was in the grip of negative emotions also.

Powerful impetus to the changes has been the philosophy of the new political thinking prompting a calm and unbiased rethinking of the old approaches and, specifically, a perception of the disagreements between states, whatever questions they concern, primarily as an objective reality of international relations. Nor are there any grounds for perceiving otherwise, as something exceptional, the disagreements between the USSR and Japan either, and, consequently, there are no nor should there be any obstacles to their discussion at the most varied levels under the conditions of glasnost and pluralism of opinions. It stands to reason that these disagreements must not be torn from the whole context of Soviet-Japanese relations and absolutized. It is clear also that the discussion of disagreements cannot fail to move in the channel of progressive tendencies of world politics and that the new political thinking cannot be viewed simplistically, as opening the way to Soviet concessions to Japan. The new political thinking is a methodology of the solution of controversial questions, and not ready-made prescriptions therefor. Even less a one-way street.

Disagreements over the history and geography of the border demarcation following WWII are a major political problem in the sides' relations. This problem is not solely and exclusively the product of the political speculation of certain political circles in Japan, although this aspect does undoubtedly exist. The Japanese side has its system of evidence engendering at times the "blinding by its own rightness" phenomenon. But the Soviet side also has its logic based on telling international-law and historical arguments.

Soviet political scientists, like all social scientists, lost much from the fact that they were for many years engaged basically in an interpretation of our official statements and positions. As a result our public opinion and specialists also, perhaps, are experiencing a manifest lack of ideas concerning the true, and not oversimplified and caricatured, position of Japan. This situation is not the best prerequisite for serious discussion on the whole range of problems of Soviet-Japanese relations, border demarcation included. It should therefore begin with a summary exposition of the Japanese view of the problem without cuts and omissions.

The object of the Japanese Government's claims are the islands of Iturup and Kunashir from the Grand Kurile chain and the islands of Habomai and Shikotan constituting the Lesser Kurile chain. All these islands are known collectively in Japan as the "Northern territories". Before 1945 these and all the other islands of the Kurile archipelago and also the southern part of the island of Sakhalin were in Japanese hands and passed to the USSR after Japan's surrender in WWII in accordance with the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) declarations of the allies in the anti-fascist coalition. In 1951

in San Francisco Japan signed a peace treaty with the majority of countries which had participated in the war against it. In accordance with this treaty, she renounced all rights, legal bases and claims to the Kurile Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin (article 2, clause C). The Soviet delegation participated in the peace conference in San Francisco, but did not sign a treaty with Japan.

Proceeding from the fact that advantages ensuing from the treaty do not extend to countries which are not signatories thereof, in 1955-1956 Japan declared at the first negotiations with the USSR since the war its rights to all the Kuriles and the southern part of the island of Sakhalin. Encountering in the course of the negotiations the Soviet side's nonacceptance of such demands, Japan renounced in stages claims initially to Southern Sakhalin and then the Kuriles from the island of Shumshu through the Urup Islands (inclusive). From this time Japan's claims have been confined to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan. In turn, the USSR, having agreed to hand over to Japan the islands of Khabomai and Shikotan, refused to do the same with the two others.

Owing to the impossibility of reaching complete accord, the parties resolved to defer to the future negotiations on a peace treaty and sign meanwhile a joint declaration on the restoration of relations, recording therein the point concerning the handover to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, but only following the conclusion of the above-mentioned peace treaty. The joint declaration was signed on 19 October 1956. On the threshold of this there had been an exchange of letters between A.A. Gromyko, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and S. Matsumoto, plenipotentiary representative of Japan. In these documents the parties confirmed their intention to hold negotiations in the future on the conclusion of a peace treaty, having discussed the question of borders also. Since the point concerning the transfer of the islands of Khabomai and Shikotan had been recorded in the joint declaration, the subject of further discussion, from the Japanese viewpoint, had to be the islands of Iturup and Kunashir.

According to the official Japanese position, Japan's stubbornness in the advancement of the demands for these islands is explained by the fact that they are all "aboriginal territory" of Japan. As the Japanese side maintains, this is confirmed by the first Russo-Japanese treaty—the 1855 Shimoda Treaty. In accordance with this treaty, the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan were under the sovereignty of Japan, and the rest of the Kuriles, of Russia. In this connection the Japanese Government instituted in 1981 "Northern Territories Day," timing it to coincide with the anniversary of the signing of the Shimoda Treaty.

It is not difficult to see that the Japanese reasoning has from the start amounted to nonrecognition of the USSR's rights to the Kuriles and the southern part of the island of Sakhalin; assertion of the special status of the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan

ensuing from the history of border demarcation; emphasis of the "inconsistency" of the Soviet side manifested in the course of the postwar negotiations with Japan. It should be added to this that Japan's efforts have long been geared to a demonstration of the total unity of views on the claims against the USSR of all Japanese.

## II

The Soviet side sees the situation quite differently. The cornerstone of the USSR's position is the proposition concerning the incontestability of Japan's renunciation of the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty. The absence beneath this treaty of the signature of the Soviet representative, as, equally, of a precise indication of to whom the territories renounced by Japan are transferred, does not in the least alter the legal nature of the renunciation itself as complete and final. It should be borne in mind also that the renunciation of "all rights, legal bases and claims" to specific territories incorporates in the interpretation of Japan itself loss of the right to pronounce on their affiliation.

In 1972 Japan and the PRC established diplomatic relations, signing a joint declaration. Giving as his reasons for the impossibility of clearly recognizing Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, M. Ohira, Japan's foreign minister at that time, declared: "Having renounced Taiwan in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, our country does not have the right to independently have its say as regards Taiwan's legal status."<sup>1</sup> We would recall, incidentally, that the PRC, just like the USSR, was not a signatory to the San Francisco Treaty.

The absence of the USSR among the signatories to the San Francisco Treaty determines for the two countries just one task—the signing of a peace treaty, but on terms which would not be contrary to each party's commitments ensuing from other treaties. In Japan's case, from the San Francisco Treaty. This evidently means in practice that Japan does not have the right to pronounce on the status of the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin. Whether the USSR's sovereignty over these territories is recognized by the other signatories to the treaty, and it was signed, besides Japan, by no more, no less than 48 countries,<sup>2</sup> is, of course, a special question. But this question in no way concerns Japan. In other words, USSR sovereignty over the Kuriles and Sakhalin is not legally a question of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Meanwhile, to judge by everything, Japan considers itself to have the right to pronounce on the status of the Kuriles and Sakhalin. As already mentioned, at the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 the Japanese side sought the handover of all these territories. At the present time, however, having limited its claims to the "Northern territories," Japan is insisting that the renunciation of the other claims was its concession to the

USSR. Japan is thereby, as before, ignoring the legal aspect of the question described above.

It is not fortuitous that all calls for the display of a rational approach prompt Japanese specialists to make statements to the effect that the claims on the four islands are the "limit of flexibility" inasmuch as, they say, Japan agrees to allow the USSR to keep the rest of the Kuriles. Such a viewpoint is expressed by, for example, Prof Hiroshi Kimura,<sup>3</sup> one of the top Japanese Sovietologists.

We have before us a map published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, that is, an official document.<sup>4</sup> Two versions of the Soviet-Japanese border incomprehensibly stand next to each other on it. One border separates Sakhalin from Hokkaido and the Urup Islands from Iturup. The other, the northern part of Sakhalin from the southern part and the Kamchatka peninsula from all the Kurile Islands. Only the old Japanese names of the inhabited localities of Southern Sakhalin are indicated on the map here. Politically the two versions of the border look like the two stages of the territorial claims.

We would emphasize once again that this position of Japan's is not legitimate inasmuch as the San Francisco Treaty deprives it of grounds in international law for advancing territorial claims against the USSR. We would note that it is because of this that the USSR's promise recorded in the 1956 joint declaration to hand over to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the signing of a peace treaty was an act of good will, and not of legal necessity, and was motivated solely by the USSR's intention to accommodate Japan's wishes.

### III

The next Japanese argument—concerning the special status of the "Northern territories"—is manifestly contrary to the international-legal aspects of Japan's position, examined above, ensuing from the San Francisco Treaty. In fact, if Japan does not consider itself bound by the renunciation of all the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin, what, it would seem, is the point of substantiating the special status of part of the Kurile archipelago? Such attempts are being made, nonetheless. The statement by Japanese Prime Minister S. Yoshida, head of the Japanese delegation at the San Francisco negotiations, made at the time of the signing of the treaty, has been made the basis thereof. According to the statement, Japan believes that the concept of the "Kurile Islands," which it renounces in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty, does not incorporate the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan.

There are many arguments in Japan today in connection with this statement. It is frequently lost sight of here that S. Yoshida's statement was a purely unilateral act in no way reflected in the wording of the San Francisco Treaty. It is perfectly obvious that the attempt to thus draw a distinction between the geographical "Kurile Islands" concept and the international-law concept is not very convincing. For this reason the analysis of the Japanese

arguments in support of the special status of the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan essentially has no direct bearing on the Soviet position. The need for such an analysis is brought about more by the unshakable confidence of the Japanese in their line of reasoning.

It is necessary first of all to call attention to the vulnerability of the proposition that the "Northern territories" are primordial Japanese land. And not only because the so-called "right of discovery" is altogether a very shaky category and, consequently, barely applicable as the point of departure for a discussion of sovereignty over some territory or other. What is more important is the fact that in the Middle Ages, as Japanese scholars themselves acknowledge, the northern parts of Japan were the domain of the principality of Matsumae, which was not familiar with the concept of a border as such.<sup>5</sup>

In 1855, when Russia and Japan signed their first treaty in history, the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Habomai and Shikotan really did pass to Japan. The other islands of the Kurile chain passed to Russia, while Sakhalin was declared a "joint possession" of the two countries. In 1875 Russia and Japan concluded a new treaty, in accordance with which all the Kuriles became Japanese, and Sakhalin, Russian. This fact alone made the subdivision of the Kuriles into northern—from Urup Island northward, and southern—from Iturup Island southward—legally meaningless. This was understood by the Japanese authorities, which did not separate the northern Kuriles into a special administrative unit, and the allies in the war against Japan and also the Japanese side itself, which attempted in 1951 at the conference in San Francisco to stipulate specially the particular status of the southern Kuriles, proceeded from this.

Following Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, one further Russo-Japanese treaty was signed in 1905 in Portsmouth. In accordance with this, the southern part of Sakhalin passed to Japan in manifest violation of the 1875 treaty.<sup>6</sup>

The Russo-Japanese negotiations in Portsmouth were of great significance because a precedent for the liquidation as a result of a war of all the treaties which had preceded it was set. The question of whether war does away with prewar treaties does not have an unequivocal practical answer, although many theorists in international law are inclined to answer in the negative. As a rule, this question is decided individually, and this means that all or a great deal depends on the existence in the specific bilateral relations of the corresponding precedent.

It was such a precedent which emerged in Portsmouth, when in response to the protest of the Russian delegation in connection with Japan's demand, contrary to the 1875 treaty, for the transfer to it of the southern part of Sakhalin the head of the Japanese delegation, Baron Z. Komura, categorically declared that wars are fought precisely to do away with old treaties.<sup>7</sup>

Thus to orient ourselves toward the precedent set on the initiative of the Japanese side, it has to be acknowledged that in the treaty and legal plane relations between the two countries have twice in history begun practically from scratch. The attempts to summon up from nonexistence old treaties are, consequently, of a purely emotional nature. It is for this reason that only the political reality which has taken shape as a result of WWII may serve as the point of departure of the debate on border demarcation. Any other approach is unrealistic and, strictly speaking, invalid.

A new stage in Soviet-Japanese relations began in 1956, when the countries restored diplomatic relations, having signed and duly ratified the corresponding joint declaration. This document recorded the readiness of the USSR, accommodating Japan's wishes, to hand over to it the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the signing in due form a peace treaty.

The further development of events led to the virtual cancellation of the provisions of the 1956 joint declaration on the handover of these islands. An adequate evaluation of this transformation presupposes a scrupulous analysis of the entire set of legal and political circumstances of the case. It was pointed out, *inter alia*, on the Soviet side that international relations are subordinate not only to the abstract theory of international law but also the logic of practical politics. And this logic had been prescribed by consistently unfriendly actions of Japan in respect of the USSR.

In their argument both sides, it would seem, have been losing sight (the Japanese, deliberately, but the Soviet, by following its opponent's line of reasoning) of one very important aspect of the problem, namely, the Japanese Government's clearly expressed reluctance to be guided by the said provision of the 1956 joint declaration.<sup>8</sup> This proposition represents a bilateral undertaking. Specifically, the undertaking of the USSR to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, and of Japan, to accept them in the context of a treaty and legal settlement of relations. Yet the Japanese Government is refusing to do so, although it is not investing its refusal with the form of a special statement. This was emphasized on the last occasion in 1985 by Prime Minister Y. Nakasone in parliament. There was a modification at that time of the wording of Japan's official position also, which is now heard as "the simultaneous return of the four northern islands".

In sum, the positions of the parties are such that they make it possible to speak not of a unilateral but solely and uniquely of a mutual rejection of the position of the 1956 joint declaration providing for the handover to Japan of the islands of Khabomai and Shikotan following the conclusion of a peace treaty. The motivation of the parties here differs. The USSR sees no possibility of transferring the two islands, and Japan considers acquisition of the two islands insufficient and is demanding four. This does not alter the essence and legal legitimacy of the mutual rejection, however.

#### IV

The Japanese Government is making very extensive use also of the proposition that all Japanese are united in support of the official policy. This proposition cannot fail to evoke entirely justified doubts, although containing a grain of truth. Like any element of the mass consciousness, consensus emerges in society not of its own accord but as the result of the directed political and propaganda efforts of specific subjects. There is no doubt that a majority, an absolute majority even, of Japanese is convinced of the justice of the territorial claims against the USSR. It is obvious that these claims have become an element of national self-awareness closely connected with the proposition that it is not so much the territories themselves as the satisfaction of injured national feelings which is important for Japan.

These facts have to be taken into consideration, although the "Northern territories" boom reflects primarily the long indoctrination of public opinion by government circles. People of the elder generations, particularly the inhabitants of the northern parts of Hokkaido, remember, of course, how this consensus was created and emerged from nonexistence. And today also professionals, who have not been cheated out of government financial and material support, are employed in work on maintaining it.

At the same time there is no unanimity concerning the object, methods of realization and necessity even of the advancement of territorial demands. It is well known that the spread of opinions here is very wide. Some people believe it necessary to lay claim to all the Kuriles, others, to the four islands, yet others counsel that two be the limit. Forces which reject in principle any territorial demarcation based on the San Francisco Treaty operate in Japan's political arena.

There is the same lack of coordination on the question of methods also. Some people are calling first for an improvement in relations with the USSR and only then for satisfaction of the territorial demands, others, on the contrary, are insisting on the hardest line possible and the virtual blackmail of the USSR using levers available to Japan. People of the postwar generations who are inclined toward pragmatism frequently evaluate the policy of the advancement of territorial claims as altogether unrealistic. In their opinion, such a policy has little relevance to Japan's real requirements. Similar views are held also by many inhabitants of Hokkaido's northern parts, primarily the fishermen, for whom the problem of the catch in waters adjacent to the "Northern territories" is far more important than these islands themselves. The pluralism of the opinions of the Japanese has been manifested particularly in recent years. It is significant that voices in support of a more wide-ranging and constructive approach to disagreements with Japan have come to be heard in the Soviet Union also.

#### V

Having examined the main points of Japan's position, we have to conclude that it lacks arguments which could be deemed indisputable. But can we let this be the end of it? I believe not. After all, the line of the border between the USSR and Japan is not legally determined since there is no peace treaty, and the parties' positions are in direct opposition. There really is on this ground a political problem in bilateral relations. This being so, a clear and precise concept of the discussion of this problem and primarily, possibly, a sober understanding of its place and significance in Soviet-Japanese relations are needed. It is today clear that ignoring the problem does not help matters. We cannot in the least seek any longer to make an absolute of it.

Like any complex and difficult question, the problem of the divergence of the two countries' views on border demarcation between them should be logically divided into parts. Three major blocks may be seen distinctly. The first is the international-law block. We would emphasize once again that it affords no grounds for some peremptory demands on the Japanese side. The international-legal aspects of the problem undoubtedly demand in-depth study. It is hard to look for the surprise appearance in this sphere of some fundamentally new arguments, but the attempts to achieve mutual understanding have by no means been fruitless.

The second block is political. The fact that agreement was reached at the time of the December negotiations in Tokyo on the creation of a permanent group at deputy foreign minister level undoubtedly reflects the new quality of political dialogue. A negotiating mechanism for discussion of the entire set of problems associated with the conclusion of a peace treaty has been created. The most complex of them is, of course, the difference of the parties' views on border demarcation.

The third block of problems is political-psychological. It is a question of a lack in Soviet-Japanese relations of mutual trust and of their political climate.

Various aspects of our relations have to have both a direct connection and feedback. This is very important inasmuch as the formula of a "package" and one-sided linkage which in fact the Japanese side is offering—without solution of the "territorial problem" serious progress in other areas is impossible—pulls us not forward, but back. Is it not productive to raise the question of the influence which the development of Soviet-Japanese relations as a whole exerts on the parties' approach to border demarcation? It has only to be emphasized once again that the USSR and Japan are not even friendly states. Not to come to terms with this is imprudent inasmuch as a peaceful border demarcation between sovereign states cannot grow out of strain and mistrust.

Following the restoration in 1972 of Japanese sovereignty over the island of Okinawa, an analogy between it and the "Northern territories" became widespread in Japan. The general hidden meaning of all the arguments

amounts to the fact that "the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, why is the USSR unwilling to follow its example?" In order to answer this not very correct question let us try to compare Japan's behavior in both situations.

In the Okinawa case it is emphasized that its return was virtually an unprecedented event in the history of international relations, which became possible only thanks to the firm friendship and complete trust which had evolved in relations between Japan and the United States in the postwar decades. In the case of the "Northern territories" directly opposite logic is employed whereby all attempts by the USSR to negotiate measures to build confidence and generally improve the political climate of bilateral relations are rejected out of hand on the pretext that first, they say, return our land, and then we will think about friendship and trust.

What is this if not one further double standard of policy, behind the use of which may be divined an endeavor to complicate a solution of the question and introduce in the mass consciousness an "image of the Soviet enemy"? If one looks at all that is being done in Japan from this viewpoint, quite a disturbing picture takes shape. All age groups of the population, the youth particularly, are being subjected to intensive indoctrination. Calls for this indoctrination to begin at the early school, and even preschool, age are being heard increasingly. The prescriptions of the indoctrination are: the simpler, the better. In sum, a very complex and contradictory problem is being reduced to a primitive struggle of "absolute good" (Japan) and "absolute evil" (the USSR). In a word, the official government line is in fact denying the new generations of Japanese the right to comprehend the problem, leaving them merely the right to condemn.

A way out of the situation is seen in the organization of wide-ranging and diverse cooperation based on concurrent or close interests. The gamut of such interests is very rich.

## VI

There is no doubt that the main question of world politics is that of war and peace. It is not simply a question here of the prevention of war but also of a general renunciation of the burden of military preparations. Military preparations are undertaken because there is a threat of war, but the threat of war also increases because military preparations are under way. On the matter of a reduction in the role of the military factor in world politics the interests of the USSR and Japan coincide, although each side has its own reasons. Japan has scored big successes in the economy largely thanks to a conscious curbing of its military efforts. Stable peace for Japan is a vital need of its economic development model. The USSR, on the other hand, is experiencing, as is known, considerable difficulties in the economy. We are faced with the question of how to release forces for its reconstruction, shifting the

emphasis accordingly from military means of safeguarding security to economic and political means.

In this context there is a similarity between the military doctrines of the USSR and Japan also. For Japan it is the principle of "nonoffensive defense" ([sensyu boey]), for us, the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency. Does this not mean that the USSR and Japan can and should begin a serious dialogue on ways to reduce the military danger in the Asia-Pacific region and on a strengthening here of trust and conduct it on both a bilateral and multilateral basis not for the sake of propaganda dividends but to achieve specific results?

A strengthening of peace and stability in the region and the conversion of the trends toward cooperation and interdependence which have emerged into general and irreversible trends could cardinaly change the approach of the USSR and Japan to many problems and realities. The task, obviously, is to ensure that the successes and failures of each country in the region be perceived by all as strengthening or weakening its integrity.

An orientation toward an improvement in relations with its neighbors is natural for the policy of any country. However, in the traditions of power politics an improvement in relations between two states still frequently evokes anxiety and doubts in third countries. This leads to mutual mistrust and complicates the situation. Ridding ourselves of a kind of "third country" complex is difficult, however much we may be convinced of its archaic nature. At the same time conversion of the Asia-Pacific region into an integral structure could really give the USSR an interest in an improvement in Japan's relations with the United States and the PRC, for example, and Japan, in an improvement in the USSR's relations with the same countries. This, in turn, would be a very considerable pan-regional gain for the new policy. Should not the USSR and Japan attempt to establish cooperation in the name of such a goal?

Within the framework of the Asia-Pacific region the coincidence or noncoincidence of the interests of the USSR and Japan are best verified in their approach to the conflict situations on the Korean and Indochina peninsulas. Formally the parties' positions are largely opposite: the USSR's allies are the DPRK and Vietnam, Japan's virtual allies are South Korea and the ASEAN countries. In keeping with the traditional logic of power politics, there can be no question of the proximity of interests of the USSR and Japan. In practice, however, the reverse is true. The conflict situations in these parts cannot be resolved in favor of one party to the conflict. The sole practicable path of solution lies via compromise and an extension of direct contacts and increased interdependence between the DPRK and South Korea and Vietnam and the ASEAN countries. Since we have concluded that the preservation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region corresponds to the interests of the USSR and Japan, this concurrence is refracted through the prism of regional conflicts as a need to work, by joint efforts included, toward a reduction in tension between

the parties to the conflicts and a renunciation of the defense of tendentious and one-sided policy, whoever is pursuing it.

What influence could the proposed development of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region exert on the state of our bilateral relations, aside from an obvious broadening of the spectrum thereof? A most positive influence, of course. Under the new conditions the existing problems and difficulties would no longer be perceived by the parties as a stumbling block. Such a change could, I believe, afford very extensive opportunities, simply inconceivable today, seemingly, for a solution of the border demarcation problem.

In fact, in Japan, for example, the problem of border demarcation with the USSR is, after all, discussed only within a framework which is determined once for all and, consequently, dogmatic: whether to agree to receive two islands or two and then a further two or only all four at once? To sign a peace treaty or sign nothing at all? From the political viewpoint (precisely, political, and not historical or international-legal, whose unproductiveness was discussed earlier) all these are options presupposing more or less profit for Japan, given the corresponding loss for the USSR. Virtually no one in Japan, however, would seem to be even contemplating options, interim included, whereby Japan's gain would be the USSR's gain also. Yet such options exist. Many, possibly.

It is in principle correct that the settlement of bilateral relations after a war, on border issues included, is not complete without the signing of a peace treaty. Does this mean, however, that the question of border demarcation being discussed by the parties may on no conditions be taken outside of a peace treaty framework? Evidently not if both parties seriously need a peace treaty as a stimulus to cooperation and wish to change the situation whereby difficulties in respect of one issue are impeding progress in other spheres. Although there is no direct analogy here, this was precisely how Japan and the PRC acted in 1978 when concluding a peace and friendship treaty without a solution of the question of border demarcation in the area of the Senkakus, which was put off until some future date.

Do the countries have the necessary potential of trust for finding a mutually acceptable untangling of the complex knot of contradictions? This is a reasonable question. As of today, no. This potential needs to be built up. We need to strive to impart dynamism to processes in the economic, political and cultural spheres of cooperation. What are needed are simply interesting and bold ideas capable of removing the seriousness of the disagreements, including, perhaps, the creation of the "sore points" of joint-enterprise zones with special conditions of cooperation and the exchange of people. The future will suggest new forms.

In a word, much is possible, but only given good will and new political thinking and, what is most important, real



progress in all fields of Soviet-Japanese relations. The reality is such that in all recent years Japan has, as before, endeavored to block our political initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, qualitatively and quantitatively limit Soviet-Japanese business relations and complicate the USSR's membership of regional economic organizations (the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and others). None of this, of course, has contributed to mutual understanding and trust.

All the more gratifying was it to note the interview with Japanese Prime Minister N. Takeshita carried in IZVESTIYA on the first day of spring this year. The Japanese leader's direct appeal to Soviet public opinion is important for the added reason that it is virtually the first time that such an action has not followed a thaw in interstate relations but, rather, has anticipated such. Notice has to be taken of the interest expressed in the interview in a deepening of Soviet-Japanese relations and also in a contribution being made in conjunction with the USSR to the region's economic and social development and in specific measures to strengthen peace and stability therein. "Japan and the USSR could walk hand in hand in the same direction..." the prime minister said.<sup>9</sup> Welcoming and sharing this position of Japan's, I would like to emphasize that for our two countries the time has come for action. It cannot be let slip for it is well known whither the road of good intentions not buttressed by practical deeds leads.

#### Footnotes

1. "Foreign Policy Survey". Yearbook of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, No 17, 1973, p 429.
2. It may be noted that in the 37 years which have elapsed since the signing of the San Francisco Treaty not a single objection on this score has been received from its signatories. Sakhalin and the Kuriles thereby indubitably belong to the USSR. Japan should have no doubt on this score since it insists on its right to ownership of the Senkakus on the grounds that at the time they were proclaimed Japanese territory in 1895 there were no objections from any country.
3. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 28 September 1988.
4. See "Thinking About the Northern Territories," Sapporo, 1982, p 9.
5. Ibid., p 12.
6. This fact prompts the well-known Japanese commentator K. Omae to put the question point-blank: "Why cannot Japan, having acquired the southern part of Sakhalin per the results of the Russo-Japanese war, reconcile itself to the fact that the USSR acquired the four northern islands per the results of the Pacific (that is, second world—author) War?" (K. Omae, "New Theory of National Wealth," Tokyo, 1986, p 7). People may take issue with K. Omae's "everyday" logic, of course, but is it not a reaction to the detachment of the official Japanese position from practice?

7. "The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922," Tokyo, 1978, vol 2, p 361.

8. In acting thus the Japanese Government is attempting to rely on the above-mentioned exchange of letters between A.A. Gromyko and S. Matsumoto. It is hardly legitimate, however, to put these letters on a par with or higher even than the joint declaration concluded not before but after the exchange of letters and ratified by the two countries' highest legislative authorities.

9. IZVESTIYA, 1 March 1989.

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#### Changes in Italy's Approach to National Security

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[Article by Nadezhda Konstantinovna Arbatova, candidate of historical sciences and senior researcher at the World Economics and International Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "The Italian Concept of National Security"]

[Text] The interests and ambitions of Italy, an average power of the capitalist world, are limited to regional limits. In global issues, Italy participates in the most important alliances of the West, supporting the unified policy of NATO or the European Community. The Italian point of view toward European security is determined by the particular features of its geopolitical, economic, and military situation, and also by the specifics of its internal political situation.

Italy's geopolitical importance is the result of its flank position in NATO and its remoteness from Central Europe. Italy does not have troops stationed in the FRG and does not have military-political responsibility for the postwar structure in Europe as a former Axis power. This explains Italy's relatively high degree of immunity to changes in the international situation related to the increase or decrease in tension between the USSR and the U.S. and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on fundamental problems of European and global policy.

At the same time, Italy's key position on NATO's southern flank and in the Central Mediterranean explains its heightened concern for events namely in this area, be it confrontation between the USSR and the U.S., crises in the Third World, or antagonisms and conflicts in relations among the NATO allies.

Up until quite recently, lagging behind the FRG, France, and Great Britain considerably in the level of economic development, Italy reacted extremely sensitively toward various schemes of West European regionalism and toward any attempts by the leading West European



countries to consolidate in one or another variant ("tri-lateral directory," plans for a "two-speed Europe," and others), afraid of being relegated to the level of a third-rate NATO power, and called for strict Atlanticism and equality of West European allies in the face of its senior overseas partner. At the same time, Italy also sought special relations with the U.S., imitating Great Britain and the FRG to a certain extent and taking advantage of its position in the Mediterranean under the conditions of the high level of U.S. military presence and interest in the region in the 1960's and early 1970's. Italy sought a partnership with the U.S., demonstrating a readiness for greater cooperation in the military area.

A considerable strengthening of Italy's economic positions in the second half of the 1980's raised it to fifth place among developed capitalist countries of the world and third place in Western Europe for the main economic indicators. In this regard, a distinctive "dichotomy" began to reveal itself with Italy, a disparity between Italy's increased economic capabilities and its international political role. Italy's growing economic energy and its political ambitions are seeking an outlet, and it is trying to play a more active role in the international arena, especially in the developing world of the Mediterranean. It is striving for an equal partnership with the U.S., hoping in the future to replace it completely in this region.

Another important source of Italy's international political activeness is the significant increase in consensus of internal political forces in foreign policy; this ensures broad support for Rome's foreign policy course.

The complete supremacy of the U.S. in the Mediterranean Sea in the 1950's and its domination in the region in the 1960's determined Italy's perception of a threat both in relations with the Soviet Union and in relations with developing countries. In the military context, Italy was oriented mainly on the southern area of confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the continent.

At the same time, Italy's peninsular position predetermined its traditional interest in the naval aspects of the confrontation between the two alliances. However, whereas the Italian Navy before was viewed exclusively as an appendage of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in carrying out its military and political functions, now Italy is more and more vigorously seeking a more weighty military role in the Mediterranean Sea.

In other words, one of the main particular features of Italy's foreign policy today is to seek a more active role in all avenues of world policy—in relations with the socialist countries, with the developing world, and with its allies and partners in NATO and the European Community. It is important to note that this quest is taking place against a background of significant changes in international politics. First, the lessening of tension in Europe, the improvement in Soviet-American relations, and the reduction of confrontation between the USSR and the U.S. in the Third World. Second, the changes in

allied relations, associated with the increase in the share of responsibility of the West European center within NATO and the relative increase in U.S. interests outside of Europe. Third, the increase in tension and instability in the Third World around the perimeter of the Mediterranean basin. All these changes are directing the energy of Italian diplomacy into specific directions.

Italy wants to play an active and positive role in relations between the East and West, pursuing a dynamic Eastern policy and advocating the strengthening of security in Europe. It is significant that the Italian leadership sees the development of the Eastern direction as a way to increase the country's political weight in Western Europe. Italy is also striving to assume responsibility for implementing the interests of NATO, Western Europe and, to an even greater extent, its own interests in the Mediterranean Sea. This determines its fundamentally different position than Central Europe on questions of security in the Mediterranean: Italy does not want to strengthen by means of agreements the role and involvement of the USSR and the U.S. in the region. It is interested in gradually reducing American influence in the Mediterranean and replacing this influence by creating a regional "European foothold," in which the main role belongs to Italy. These considerations determine Italy's negative attitude toward any negotiations on limiting naval activities and naval arms.

Thus, Italy's policy is developing in two different directions.

Italian ruling circles today link safeguarding national security with the completion of strategic tasks put into four groups: a) maintaining a balance between military-political alliances and in relations with foreign partners; b) defending national territory; c) maintaining balance and stability in the Mediterranean Sea; ensuring freedom of movement and access to Mediterranean ports for Italy and allied and neutral states; and also active protection of Italian citizens and property abroad; d) carrying out "overseas actions."<sup>1</sup> Italy's zones of strategic interests are also determined in accordance with these tasks: national territory, NATO's zone of action, the area of the Mediterranean Sea, and regions near the Mediterranean—the Persian Gulf, the African Horn, and others.

From the time it joined NATO, Italian ruling circles have viewed safeguarding military security in the context of a concept common to all participants in the alliance. All governments of Italy during the postwar period have proclaimed adherence to NATO as the main means of restraining a potential aggressor from aggressive inclinations.

At the same time, the Italian approach to specific aspects of security in the second half of the 1980's has its own specific nature, caused by changes in the leadership's ideas about the nature and sources of the threat, problems of alliance relations between Europe and the U.S., and overestimation of Italy's role in NATO.

The paramount importance attached by the Italian leadership to the "Soviet threat" depends on many factors, associated in particular with the state of relations between the East and West and with the internal political alignment of forces in Italy. However, the geostrategic factor is the main one, the importance of which can change significantly, as is shown by the example of Italy.

The external threat, from the standpoint of the Italian leadership, today has two dimensions—northeastern and southern.

The notion about the possibility of an invasion by land to the northeast of Italy and about the means of countering such an invasion was formulated both within the framework of NATO's overall approach to the "USSR military threat" and on the basis of an assessment of military potentials. Italy's flanking position in NATO, not only from the standpoint of geostrategic position but also from the standpoint of economic and military might, has for many years preordained its subordinate position in alliance relations and the "virtually complete transfer of national defense to the armed forces of NATO."<sup>2</sup> In accordance with the ideas on the means and methods of achieving NATO goals in a possible war, the Italian Armed Forces are tasked with covering the northeastern front (the so-called "doorstep" in the vicinity of the city of Gorizia). To this end, 80 percent of Italy's Armed Forces are assigned to protect the northeastern border, which comprises 10 percent of the length of national borders.<sup>3</sup> Defense of the maritime borders is considered a secondary task, since up until the 1960's the leading circles of NATO countries perceived the southern flank itself not as an independent theater of military operations but merely as a continuation of the borders of the Central European Theater. In addition, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which was assigned an important place in defending the southern flank, dominated the Mediterranean completely right up until the mid-1960's.

The crisis development of the international political situation in the Mediterranean, particularly in its eastern part in connection with the events in the Middle East and on Cyprus, which over the last 20 years has become increasingly dangerous in scale, intensification of the U.S. policy of force in the region, and the establishment of a USSR naval presence on a permanent basis here beginning in the mid 1960's—all these factors sharply increased the importance of both the Mediterranean region as a whole and Southern Europe in the military-strategic relations between the East and West. Both the role of Italy, occupying an exceptionally important geostrategic position on the southern flank, and the importance of the Mediterranean axis in Italian national security policy increased accordingly.

The arrival of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean Sea in order to limit the actions of the Sixth Fleet in crisis situations was perceived by the Italian ruling circles as a challenge to the absolute U.S. naval superiority in the region, which was fundamental for protecting Italy from the south. The crisis of detente contributed to the

launching of a broad campaign in the U.S. and Western Europe on the "Soviet threat," in which the Mediterranean aspect was especially emphasized with respect to Italy. Problems of relations between North and South, extremely painful for Western Europe, also ended up intertwined in this campaign. In Italy and other NATO countries, the actions of the USSR were seen as directed at strengthening its positions in the areas to the south of the central zone of confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in particular by strengthening its allies in the non-European Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup> Problems of the economic security of Western Europe were also analyzed from this point of view. Even the events in Afghanistan were interpreted by some experts in Italy as "Soviet expansion aimed at encircling the Mediterranean from the south and creating a base for its political and military control in an area of special strategic importance as Southwest Asia."<sup>5</sup> The supposedly emerging possibility of the Soviet Union controlling the Persian Gulf area by using bases on the territory of Afghanistan was interpreted as a direct threat to the security of Western Europe, which is dependent on petroleum imports from this region.

Of course, far from everyone in the ruling circles of Italy shared this point of view. It rather indicates the importance, hypertrophied in other instances, of the Mediterranean axis in Italian policy. Moreover, it should be noted that hardly anyone sees the "Soviet threat from the south" as a surprise attack on Italy. They see the greatest danger primarily in an escalation of local conflicts, which can have extremely dangerous consequences in conditions of a two-sided military confrontation.

A further diversification of the concept of the "threat from the south" is taking place in the 1980's. An autonomous threat has been added to the threat from the south along the line of relations between East and West. It is caused by factors not associated with either the presence or the policy of the USSR<sup>6</sup>, noted Italian expert M. Cremasco. These new factors, in the opinion of the Italian leadership, are associated with the instability in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa, with the militarization of the coastal developing states of the Mediterranean, with the problem of terrorism, and with the strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism after the fall of the shah's regime in Iran. These destabilizing trends in the developing world of the Mediterranean, in the opinion of Italian ruling circles, raise the question of the need for a West European presence beyond NATO's sphere of responsibility—both for ensuring the security of Western Europe (including economic security associated with continuous deliveries of energy raw materials) and for strengthening alliance relations with the U.S., which is seeking the allies' assistance in its policy beyond Europe.

In accordance with the changed notions about the nature and source of the threat to national interests, Italy began to reassess and restructure its defense policy in the 1980's. The initiator of this restructuring was the socialist L. Lagorio, then minister of defense. According

to the "Lagorio doctrine," the "threat from the south" should be countered both by strengthening the southern borders (transferring there a portion of the forces and building a new radar network) and by organizing a more "active" defense to protect national interests abroad and ensure support for the United States in the area of the Mediterranean Sea and in areas adjacent to it. A widespread debate unfolded around these proposals in the first half of the 1980's; despite the ambiguous reaction of the Italian generals, in the end the "Lagorio doctrine" became the basis of Italy's current defense policy. The white book on defense issues published in 1985 reflected the new trends, above all the sharp "Mediterraneanization" of the security policy and the shift to Italy's more active participation in safeguarding the security of Western Europe. In particular, in analyzing the white book, Italian experts direct attention to the fact that it devotes primary attention to namely the "threat from the south." Another noteworthy conceptual innovation is that the white book formulated for the first time the thesis on "Italy's contribution to the defense of the southern front." This, according to some estimates, can be viewed as adopting the "second front" concept, whereas before they talked exclusively about Italian participation in protecting NATO's southern flank.<sup>7</sup>

The trend toward "Mediterraneanization" was also manifested in the expanded missions given the armed forces, which now include carrying out operations to maintain peace and security abroad. To this end, in 1986 Italy created a rapid deployment force (RDF) with a strength of 10,000 men (two ground brigades, a light aviation army regiment, amphibious forces and transport aviation subunits, and also other formations). Creation of the RDF, intended for offensive combat operations beyond the national territory and beyond the sphere of NATO's responsibility, evoked criticism in a certain portion of the political circles, primarily from the left-wing, fearing that Italy would be drawn into conflicts. In particular, they pointed out the paradoxical situation: The RDF, created to protect national interests abroad, actually poses a substantial danger to these interests. Regardless of how limited the use of the RDF is beyond the national borders, in a crisis situation the very fact of transferring military units to a conflict region may be perceived as a confirmation of the possibility of a surprise attack, which can lead to catastrophic consequences. In addition, experts also doubt the effectiveness of the RDF to conduct operations to free hostages, citing the American experience in Teheran.

Under pressure of criticism, in 1987 the military leadership was forced to declare the RDF to be "mobile formations intended for defending the national territory."<sup>8</sup> However, two possibilities of using the RDF abroad are permitted: in the event of Libyan aggression against Tunisia and also for actions to restrain Greece and Turkey.<sup>9</sup>

Creation of the Italian RDF, regardless of how it was motivated, essentially indicated an orientation to

assume more weighty military obligations in the Mediterranean and also to correspond more to U.S. requirements outside of Europe, that is, tasks not associated with American obligations on the southern flank. In this regard, it should be noted that the Italian leadership's support of the American policy of expanding NATO's sphere of responsibility often came into conflict with the specific actions by the U.S. in developing countries and with respect to developing countries, giving rise to problems both in the area of Italian-American relations and in the area of security.

Whereas Italy's participation in the multinational peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and "Irangate" caused the Italian leadership to become deeply disillusioned with the reliability of its American ally, whereas the incident surrounding the Achille Lauro<sup>10</sup> and the Egyptian aircraft forced to land by the Americans at the base in Sigonella stimulated debates over the legal status of NATO bases on Italian territory, the bombing of Libya by the United States in April 1986 directly affected the interests of Italy's national security. During the escalation of the American-Libyan conflict, on 15 April Libya launched two missiles toward the island of Lampedusa which exploded near the island. The incident evoked debates in the Italian political circles, during the course of which, in particular, the proposal was made to transfer the U.S. Sixth Fleet to the NATO command in order to "avoid the possibility of it being used in unilateral actions." Undoubtedly, the "Libyan events" affected the sharpness of the polemics that unfolded in September 1987 in Italy over sending Italian ships to the Persian Gulf. Despite the positive decision on Italy's military presence in the Persian Gulf, it is important to note that this question was discussed thoroughly in political and academic circles in Italy than in the U.S. This was determined primarily by the understanding of the fact that participation in the American actions could cause noticeable damage to national interests.

The new trends in Italy's defense policy became a subject of widespread discussion in the parliament. In particular, it was noted that they are contrary to the "exclusively defensive nature of Italy's military tools" stated in the country's constitution. The certain concern over the "Mediterraneanization" of the defense policy was also stated in military-political circles, which feared that the "second front" would divert attention from those directions which are more important. "It is fair that the problem of defense in the south has acquired new aspects in recent years and requires assuming serious obligations; but it is also fair that defense in the northeast, as before, maintains its priority nature."<sup>11</sup>

"Mediterraneanization" of the concept of national security and the defense policy as a means of safeguarding it was also criticized during discussions about the consequences of the INF Treaty for the security of Western Europe and also in connection with the increased interest of West European countries in the problem of conventional arms. In particular, it was noted that excessive "Mediterraneanization" of the security policy

has resulted in Italy's "departure" from Europe and its self-removal from the fundamental problems in relations between the East and West. It is proposed to compensate for this tilt by more active involvement in Central European topics and in efforts to strengthen the European support of NATO.

The latter is most directly linked to the question of American-West European relations in the military-political sphere. For Italy, the special relations with the U.S. for almost 30 years not only signified an admission that its "real defense is in the hands of the Americans and that America is the decisive force in the Atlantic alliance,"<sup>12</sup> but also were a means of holding back certain economic and political positions in a number of main countries of Western Europe. Even the stationing of American medium-range missiles on the territory of Italy was considered by the Italian leaders, not so much from the military-strategic as from the political standpoint, as a means of increasing the country's prestige in American-West European relations.

The economic spurt made by Italy by the mid-1980's, which enabled it to overtake France and Great Britain in a number of indicators and also lessened its dependence on the U.S., stimulated the country's more active participation in the West European integration processes. At the same time, the INF Treaty gave new impetus to the debates on problems of West European military-political cooperation. Defense also contributes to implementing a more global project of European integration, on which Italy insists, as was noted in the De Mita government program adopted in April 1988. Whereas the creation of a Franco-West German brigade did not meet with unanimous approval by the country's political leadership, the proposal to form a "European Defense Council" was supported in the government's program: "Italy is quite interested in European coordination on issues of security, particularly by means of creating a kind of European council." During 1988, Italy concluded a number of "treaties on operational defense with the FRG, France, Spain, and Great Britain."<sup>13</sup>

The Italian leadership's course toward radical modernization of the armed forces is also revealing in light of the trend toward strengthening "European support" of NATO. In 1988, Minister of Defense V. Zanone drafted a law on allocating additional funds in the upcoming 10-year period for modernizing ground, naval, and air forces in order to satisfy the "new requirements" of NATO after reduction of the nuclear arsenals in Europe.<sup>14</sup> In accordance with the law, in the next decade Italy intends to fundamentally renew its fleet of armored equipment, warships, carrier-based aircraft, and surface-to-air missile systems, and to participate actively in creating a "European fighter" and new radar systems. True, in the opinion of some experts, increasing appropriations for military construction is neither the only possible nor the best solution to problems arising in the area of military safeguarding of security; in particular, it would make sense to devote more attention to redistributing responsibilities in NATO.<sup>15</sup>

There is no doubt that the course of West European countries toward strengthening the "European support" of NATO is being formed in the direction of overall consolidation of the West European center of strength, at the basis of which lies an objective driving force. However, with the high level of military confrontation in Europe, it can be expressed primarily in the build-up of the military might of West European members of the bloc, which is fraught with an increase in negative trends in military-strategic relations between East and West, including on the southern flank of the continent. In this regard, the fact that, despite the stated concern for the security of Western Europe, Italy is exercising restraint in discussing specific issues concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe calls attention to itself.

This, apparently, is also linked to the Italian leadership's course toward radical modernization of the armed forces and to fears that the negotiations will raise the question of limiting military expenditures. Addressing the Italian-American Chamber of Commerce on 17 February 1988, Minister of Defense V. Zanone emphasized: "One paradox is that it is necessary to begin modernizing defense at a time when awareness of the danger is weakening and under conditions of democracy it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve approval of defense programs by public opinion and, consequently, by parliaments... To maintain defense at the appropriate level, Europe must take the following steps: maintain close cooperation between the two coasts of the Atlantic, strengthen the European support of NATO, combine resources and defense programs in light of the gradual military integration during political integration, and identify long-term programs of modernizing national armed forces up to the year 2000."

The question of decreasing the East's quantitative superiority and the West's lag in conventional arms occupies a central place in the debate over the problem of reducing conventional arms and armed forces. Italy approved the 30 March 1988 statement by the Warsaw Pact ministers of foreign affairs on eliminating existing asymmetries and disproportions in conventional arms of the East and West and on the possibility of transparency and exchange of information on military potentials. At the same time, two points of view were formed in the ruling circles on the question of quantitative reductions. Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Andreotti, repeatedly speaking on this issue, has emphasized that balancing the armed forces and conventional arms must, under any circumstances, be accomplished by sharply reducing the surplus forces of the side that has a superiority (primarily in armor and artillery), but not by increasing the armament of the other side. In the opinion of proponents of this approach, identical upper limits can be established below the level of the weaker side. Leading military circles held a somewhat different position, leaving Italy the right to rearm taking into account its defense needs.

A compromise between these two points of view is the position of Defense Minister V. Zanone, who stated that

the quantitative disproportions between East and West should be evened out by reducing to lower levels, if this will be necessary. In the defense minister's opinion, future talks on conventional arms in Europe must get the USSR to apply the same principles of reduction that it followed during the INF talks and agreed to eliminate three times as many nuclear warheads than the Americans.

Initially, Italy, as well as the U.S., Great Britain, and France, came out against including tactical nuclear weapons in the talks (including nuclear components of dual-purpose weapons). Thus, they demonstrated an adherence to the decisions on modernizing nuclear weapons adopted at Montebello, Canada, in 1983 and confirmed at a meeting in Monterey, California, in 1986. However, at a meeting of NATO heads of states and governments in Brussels, Italy unexpectedly came out in favor of limiting NATO's reliance on nuclear restraint in the future.

At the same time, the Italian government quite persistently supports excluding tactical strike aviation from the talks. To a certain extent, Italy's stand is tied to the problem of relocating an air wing of American F-16 fighter-bombers stationed in Spain, which has demanded the U.S. withdraw them over the next 3 years. Defense Minister V. Zanone came out categorically against the withdrawal of these aircraft beyond Europe, stating that they have great importance for the defense of NATO's southern zone. In his opinion, the West should not take any actions of unilateral disarmament at all. What is more, in the opinion of the Italian leadership, even if the Warsaw Pact is willing to withdraw a similar number of aircraft, NATO should refrain from deciding this question and return to it after the planned relocation; it would be possible to return to this question later—in particular, having in mind the experience of the stationing of Euromissiles. As we know, Italy has suggested that Washington station these aircraft on its territory.

In developing its approach to talks on reducing conventional arms and armed forces, the Italian leadership initially supported the idea of conducting them by all 35 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, it later sided with the NATO countries' demand that the talks be conducted in a group of 23 representatives of the two blocs. Officially, it has expressed a sharply negative attitude toward creation of "zones of unequal security." At the basis of this position, as Defense Minister V. Zanone explains, is Italy's traditional striving for "an equal distribution of risk" in NATO. The Italian government favors including Italy in the Central European zone of arms reductions.

At the Geneva meeting of the CSCE members, within the framework of an editing group involved in examining problems of the Mediterranean, Italy, along with the U.S., the FRG, and France, exerted considerable efforts to postpone indefinitely discussion of subject matter dealing with military aspects of security in the Mediterranean Sea. This position is the result of the course of the

ruling circles for strengthening NATO's southern flank—in particular, by involving non-Mediterranean members of the alliance in defense of the Mediterranean. Italian-German consultations were held in May 1988, at which they discussed questions of cooperation between Italy and the FRG in the area of operational planning. This cooperation should be viewed, on the one hand, as a possible increase in Italian military presence in Central Europe and, on the other hand, as an increase in West German military presence in the Mediterranean. Rome's negative attitude toward limiting naval arms is linked to the specific nature of naval confrontation in the Mediterranean Sea, where military-strategic relations between the East and West are closely intertwined with regional conflicts, above all in the Middle East. The U.S. commitments to Israel under conditions of the unsettled conflict today rule out the possibility of such talks. In addition, prospects for holding them will also depend on progress in talks on reducing conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, as well as on resolution of the question of counting the Black Sea squadron when estimating USSR naval arms in the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet thesis that the USSR is a Black Sea state, which means also a Mediterranean state, is interpreted by some experts as an admission of the inseparability of the military-strategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.

In analyzing the new trends in the Italian concept of security and defense policy, one can conclude that the Italian leadership today links the safeguarding of military security with strengthening of national positions within the framework of NATO, and also with intensifying bilateral and multilateral efforts for defense of the Mediterranean (including coordinating actions with Spain and France).<sup>16</sup> Paramount attention is given to relations with the U.S.; however, Italy's importance for safeguarding American interests in the Mediterranean is also emphasized. Maintaining its adherence to a predominantly Mediterranean orientation in the approach to safeguarding military security, the Italian leadership is striving to see that it is perceived by its allies not from the standpoint of purely regional, secondary interests, but from the standpoint of the security of the West as a whole. To this end, the ruling circles in Italy are initiators of forming a South European grouping in NATO with the participation of France and Spain, which indicates the regional embodiment of the "idea" of European support of NATO in the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and cooperation with the U.S. beyond NATO's zone of responsibility, on the other. At the same time, Rome is interested in seeing that allied actions in the regional do not damage the country's ties with the developing world in the Mediterranean.

#### Footnotes

1. L. Calligaris, C.M. Santoro. "Obiettivo Difesa. Strategia, direzione politica, comando operativo." Milano, 1986, p. 12.

2. S. Palidda. "La politica di difesa in Italia." (PONTE, No 3, 1985, p 88).

3. Ibid., p 93.

4. See: M. Cremasco, S. Silvestri. "Il fianco sud della NATO," Milano, 1980. "The Mediterranean Region". Ed. by L. Luciani. London and Canberra. 1984, pp 206-238.

5. POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, September 1983, p 60.

6. See: "The Mediterranean Region"..., pp 206-238.

7. "L'Italia nella politica internazionale. Anno tredicesimo 1984-1985." Milano, 1986, p 151.

8. Ibid., p 155.

9. THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, April-June 1987, p 86.

10. The incident that took place on 7 October 1985 with the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, which carried American tourists and which was seized by one of the Arab extremist groupings, as a result of which one U.S. citizen was murdered, served as grounds for a brief but serious aggravation of Italian-American relations. After the ship was freed and the Italian authorities conducted an investigation, A. Abbas, whom the U.S. accused of planning the seizure of the vessel, was freed.

Several days later, American aviation forced an Egyptian aircraft, which was carrying extremists involved in the seizure of the Achille Lauro, to land at the base at Sigonella, Italy. The U.S. actions were not coordinated with Rome and evoked a stormy debate in Italian political circles. These events resulted in a crisis for the government of B. Craxi. (See: "L'Italia nella politica internazionale. Anno quattordicesimo 1985-1986," Milano, 1986, p 27.

11. "L'Italia nella politica internazionale. Anno tredicesimo 1984-1985," Milano, 1986, pp 164-166.

12. P. Quaroni. "Problemi della politica del nostro tempo," Milano, 1966, p 103.

13. GIORNALE, 14 August 1988.

14. L. Calligaris. "Italy's Role in Defense of Europe." (INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, August 1988, p 921).

15. Ibidem.

16. See: THE INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR, April-June 1987, p 87.

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### Textbook on CEMA Criticized as Insufficiently Critical

18160010e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 89 pp 140-143

[M. Pozolotin review: "CEMA—Need for Renewal"]

[Text] The group work in question\* gives, on the whole, an idea of the forms and scale of the political, economic, cultural and military cooperation of the CEMA countries at the new stage of development. One feels that the material has been prepared by qualified, competent specialists knowledgeably and in intelligible form. Nonetheless, while reading the book I was dogged by a sense of a certain dissatisfaction.

CEMA has been in existence for 40 years now. In this time its machinery has grown considerably and become cumbersome and costly. Over 300 permanent and temporary working bodies function within its executive authorities.<sup>1</sup> True, at the 44th session of CEMA (1988) it was cut back considerably, but it remains large. Earlier CEMA activity was part of a zone which was closed to criticism, but now, in the era of glasnost, the people have a right to know how this organization is working and whether it is justifying its purpose.

It would therefore have been, in my view, entirely appropriate for the authors to have illustrated more thoroughly the following questions. What is the efficiency of CEMA? Of what specific benefit has its activity been to individual countries, including the USSR? What are the specific advantages of multilateral compared with bilateral cooperation? What major problems have been tackled which it would have been difficult or impossible to have tackled on a bilateral basis? Has it been possible, relying on CEMA, to reduce to some extent the distance separating the socialist from the capitalist countries in the technological and S&T planes?

The work contains little criticism (except for the remarks on pages 151-153), less than CEMA deserves. Yet at its 43d special session (October 1987) K. Gross, then chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, advocated a fundamental reorganization of the structure and methods of the operation of CEMA, staff cuts and the surmounting of elements of bureaucratism. The material of the session noted also that integration processes in CEMA were moving considerably more slowly than in the EC countries, where 40-50 percent of the mechanical engineering product, for example, is manufactured on a joint-labor basis, but in the CEMA countries, barely 10 percent. The creation of a single 12-state market is to be completed in the EC in 1992, but CEMA is as yet only just looking for approaches to this problem.<sup>2</sup>

It was said at the 44th meeting of the session of this organization (July 1988) that the economic interaction of its members was not as yet duly influencing an increase in the efficiency of their national economy.

Specialization and cooperation were developing at an insufficient pace. N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, observed that the comprehensive program of S&T progress was as yet exerting an inadequate influence on the modernization of the production base of the CEMA countries. (Maryai), the Hungarian representative, declared stagnation in the cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

The book could have dwelt in more detail on an analysis of all these phenomena. The authors speak about the contradictions which are present within CEMA in passing, but fail to adduce specific facts. But why not mention, specifically, that the idea of the creation of a joint market of the CEMA countries (it would very likely contribute to the development of economic relations between them) is encountering objections on the part of Romania<sup>4</sup> and why not explain the reasons for this position?

We would note that Yu.S. Shiryayev, the leader of the book's group of authors, was sharper in his criticism of the negative phenomena in the work of CEMA and revealed the causes thereof in his article in KOMMUNIST. Specifically, he wrote that many mutually profitable and voluntary collective actions were being interpreted in certain circles in a spirit of the infringement of national sovereignty and that each intergovernmental CEMA body was a body of intergovernmental cooperation and that its members were guided primarily by national interests.<sup>5</sup> These important points are not, unfortunately, reflected in the book in question. True, the authors of the work nonetheless conclude that "a radical transformation of the mechanism of mutual cooperation is necessary" (p 159), but in what way and in what forms is not said.

The work is not free of insufficiently precise and, at times, outdated wording. Thus page 17 speaks about the plan-oriented growth of the economy based on the domination of public ownership as a regularity of the building of socialism. Under the present conditions of pluralism of forms of ownership this wording would seem inadequate. After all, the idea is that use of the property of cooperative workers, persons employed in individual labor activity, farmers, mixed enterprises and so forth should also contribute to the growth of the economy.

Page 20 points out: "By the mid-1980's the socialist world had made substantial progress. A new social system had been firmly established in a large group of European, Asian and American states. These countries have created strong economic, scientific and military-political potential and achieved significant results in raising the population's living standard."

Let us start with the fact that none of the points contained in this extract pertains to all the CEMA socialist countries. Why, for example, had the new social system become firmly established in, say, Bulgaria or the GDR only by the mid-1980's? And, further: can we speak of significant results in raising the living standard of the

population, and in virtually stagnant years, what is more, in Poland, the USSR and certain other countries where there is an acute shortage of goods and inflation and where certain categories of the population are having difficulty making ends meet?

The assertion on page 37 would seem contentious also: "A condition of the harmonious combination of the national-state and international interests of the socialist countries is support for and the awakening of revolutions in all countries." But what about the priority of general interests over class interests and the proposition that "an objective limit to class confrontation in the international arena: the threat of universal annihilation"<sup>6</sup> has emerged? The authors should obviously have specified the kind of support and, even more, "awakening of revolutions in all countries" they had in mind. Did our military support of the revolution in Afghanistan not lead us into confrontation with the United States, Pakistan and Iran and cause dissatisfaction in China and did it not lead to an exacerbation of the bloody internecine war in this country itself?

Page 82 of the book points out that the purpose of the CEMA countries' cooperation is, specifically, the gradual rapprochement and equalization of the economic development levels of the states which are members thereof. Although this idea belongs not to the authors of the book but to the CEMA Executive Committee, it is still dubious, in my view.

Would not this be equalization in backwardness? The European socialist countries are now endeavoring to develop rapidly to overcome their lag behind the highly developed Western states, and Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia are having to develop even more rapidly. But how? The resource situation of the European socialist countries is very strained. In addition, they have built up a tremendous debt of the order of \$100 billion, to pay off which it is necessary to increase exports of the most valuable commodities. And the latter are thus being taken from the domestic CEMA market. And what, let us suppose, if a further 10 developing countries join CEMA, it being an open organization? Will it be necessary to once again apply the brakes until they have pulled up to the general level?

Nor does the assertion on page 96 tie in with this concept: "Changes in the correlations of the European CEMA countries' economic development levels are a continuous process." Consequently, on the one hand an equalization of levels, on the other, continuous change in their correlations. It would probably have been more correct to have spoken of assistance to Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia on the part of the more developed socialist countries, and not of an equalization of levels.

Page 91 states that the members of CEMA "have for seven 5-year plans... been successfully coordinating their 5-year plans of economic and S&T development." The word "successfully" could obviously have been dropped here. It is well known that national planning also is at a



very low level, at least in some countries. Whence the tremendous disproportions, imbalance and acute shortage not only of consumer staples but of certain machines, raw material and intermediate products also. Under these conditions coordinating national plans is very difficult, and there are many shortcomings here. The authors themselves write on pages 150-153 that a mechanism of deceleration of the international socialist division of labor has taken shape and that there is "unwarranted parallelism," difficulties in the adjustment of plans agreed for a 5-year period, the disappearance from the CEMA market of commodities heading for the West, the "motley nature" of equipment in different countries entailing the nonlinkage of engineering concepts, insufficient study of prices at the time of plan coordination and, at times, the determination thereof with hindsight and so forth.

Page 97 maintains that "the task of building the material-technical base of socialism... in the countries of CEMA's European region has been accomplished, in the main." But what are the criteria here? And what kind of material-technical base of socialism is it if it is not in a position to provide the people with food and other commodities and if in terms of its technical level it lags far behind the level of the developed capitalist countries?

Mention is made on page 107 among the CEMA countries which have encountered an increase in inflationary processes only of Poland, Hungary and Vietnam. This, apparently, is not the case in other countries, which does not, of course, correspond to reality.

Page 114 says that the CEMA countries occupy leading positions in world invention. The USSR outstrips the United States in terms of the number of inventions more than twofold, and Japan, almost twofold. But what are the results? The authors themselves point out on page 154 that the CEMA countries account for 40 percent of inventions registered in the world annually, but that their share of world license trade does not amount to 5 percent even, and a significant portion of the inventions is not, as is known, introduced in the socialist countries themselves, that is, simply comes to nothing. Can we under these conditions speak of "leading positions in world invention"?

The book studies the question of the introduction of plan coordination not only at interstate level but also at sector and enterprise level (p 168). It is well known that national planning and plan coordination at the interstate level suffer from serious shortcomings. Would not plan coordination at sector and enterprise level not add further difficulties and confusion, perhaps? We would note for fairness' sake that the authors merely set forth the essence of the decisions of the 44th CEMA Session on this question, without going into the substance of it.

The work assesses positively the CEMA countries' creation of joint ventures. And this is correct. However, there is no precise explanation of why they have not

become widespread (p 202). The journal KOMMUNIST, for example, points out that in all the socialist countries put together only 11 partners are participating in joint enterprise with the USSR, whereas 13 firms are taking part in this form of cooperation with us in the FRG alone.<sup>7</sup> We would add that 161 companies with Bulgarian participation in 49 countries, this including only 3 socialist countries, were registered overseas in 1988.<sup>8</sup>

The section on the CEMA countries' relations with the developed capitalist countries does not for some reason or other examine the question of relations between CEMA and the EEC. Yet negotiations on the establishment of relations between these very important economic groupings have been under way for a long time, and a declaration on the establishment of official relations between CEMA and the EEC was signed on 25 June 1988 in Luxembourg.<sup>9</sup>

In a word, granted all its undoubted merits, the work in question has once again compelled the thought that many difficult problems of the further development of the socialist community still await in-depth scientific analysis.

#### Footnotes

\* "Sovremennyy etap razvitiya sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva i perestroyka. Uchebnoye posobiye" [Current State of the Development of the Socialist Community and Perestroyka. Teaching Aid], Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1988, pp286.

1. EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV No 2, 1988, p 20.

2. Ibid., No 1, 1988, p 82; No 8, 1988, p 9.

3. Ibid., No 10, 1988, pp 4, 15, 44, 69.

4. Ibid., No 10, 1988, p 38.

5. KOMMUNIST No 6, 1988, pp 911, 96.

6. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World," Moscow, 1987, p 150.

7. KOMMUNIST No 12, 1988, p 45.

8. BULGARSKAYA VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA Nos 3-4, 1988, p 22.

9. EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV No 8, 1988, p 9.

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### Book on IMF Reviewed

18160010f Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 5, May 89 pp 148-150

[M. Burova review: "World-Economic Relations: IMF's Coordinating Role"]

[Text] The need for an analysis of the current particularities of the activity of the IMF and the possible prospects of its further evolution has been brought about by the qualitative changes which have occurred in capitalism's currency and finance system in the past two decades and which have demanded that it be brought into line with the contemporary nature of the internationalization of production and capital. The subject is lent urgency also by the particular revision of the USSR's position on the matter of cooperation with the Fund as a leading international currency and finance organization.

The book in question\* examines the place and role of the IMF in the said system and new aspects of the Fund's activity in the 1980's—a period of active search for more efficient forms of state-monopoly regulation. As it observes, at the present time a system of regulation is emerging whereby the elaboration of the main measures in this sphere is the result of the joint actions of governments, central banks and the most important banking monopolies, and their implementation is being entrusted mainly to the private sector. Within the framework of this mechanism the IMF is becoming a kind of coordinator and catalyst of changes both in the policy of individual states and in the practice of the private sector (p 17). The book distinguishes three main questions on which this IMF activity is concentrated: the need for regulation of the system of currency resources; the increased role of state and interstate bodies in the financing of the developing countries in view of the incapacity of the commercial banks to ensure a stable and predictable transfer of resources; the development of the interstate coordination of economic policy and the creation of the necessary institutional bases for this (pp 17-18). The organizational structure of the Fund and the decision-making mechanism are illustrated in detail. True, speaking of the growth of the IMF's coordinating role, the author leaves in the background, unfortunately, the question of the specific instruments with which the Fund may achieve, for instance, the concordance of the political courses of different countries since the emphasis in the monograph is placed on the institutional aspects.

The work pays much attention to the contradictions and clashes between individual states and groups thereof on the question of the role of the IMF and its principal tasks and functions. Incidentally, it was largely thanks to the existence of contradictions as a necessary condition of any development that the members of the Fund switched to the Jamaica currency system (despite its shortcomings, it was a marked step forward compared with the Bretton Woods system) and formulated richer and more

capacious forms of cooperation than those which the socialist states possess as of the present.

IMF policy in the sphere of international liquidity concentrates on an enhancement of the role of SDR's (special drawing rights) as a component of international liquid resources, problems of the functioning of the mechanism of the SDR's and their evolution from a distinctive variety of interstate credit toward the function of basic asset of the international currency system, which is the IMF's long-term task. As the book observes, the slight progress in respect of introduction of the SDR's has been caused largely by the absence of significant transactions involving the use of this international currency unit in the private sector; the appropriate clearing system for making payments directly in SDR's and their direct use in settlements between banks would contribute to it becoming more widespread (p 48). In our view, greater emphasis should be put on the fact that difficulties involving the introduction of this unit of account are caused by its dual nature and indeterminate status in the international currency system.

The development of the connection between the IMF and the central banks on the one hand and the commercial banks conducting transactions in SDR's on the other could in the future, evidently, be a principal direction of the Fund's evolution and lead to it being endowed with certain settlement functions in relations with the private sector (p 49).

S. Gorbunov examines the evolution of the role of gold, believing that "a certain resurrection to this extent or the other of the mechanism of the gold standard, which is happening on a different basis, however, is being observed. The monetary role of gold is being realized via its commodity nature, via the valuation of its worth in paper currencies on the free market" (p 62). It is hard to agree with this. It would seem that gold in this case plays the part of a highly liquid resource (that is, a resource which may be profitably used to pay off debt obligations) which has shed the property of direct exchangeability for any other commodity. Formulation of the question of the partial restoration of its "role of universal means of payment for paying off international obligations" (ibid.) is thereby hardly justified.

The expansion of the IMF's "multilateral" supervision—its analysis of the mutual influence of the leading Western states' policy in the sphere of balances of payments and exchange rates, estimation of the scale of their impact on the world capitalist economy as a whole and the organization of collective actions to bring these states' economic policy courses closer together in the future—could turn the Fund into a kind of center for the elaboration of concerted economic strategy on the scale of the world capitalist economy (p 92).

The work examines in sufficient detail the current mechanism of the granting of credit, the modification of the terms of credit agreements and the basic sources of financing of the IMF's credit activity. It is observed that

the increase in its transactions in the proportion of loan capital is to a certain extent changing the nature of this organization, which is acquiring the features of a kind of financial broker like the commercial banks. This character of the Fund could strengthen to a considerable extent if it is authorized to borrow on private capital markets (p 128).

The monograph pays great attention to the problem of the IMF's relations with the international capital markets in connection with the exacerbation of the young independent states' debt crisis. The Fund's tasks in the current situation are defined: brokerage in questions of a revision of the debt repayment terms; stimulation of the banks to further extension of credit to countries with an unfortunate economy in conjunction with and under the supervision of the IMF; stimulation of economic growth for the purpose of stabilization of debtors' payment position. The Fund would be the guarantor of the debtors' solvency by means of the conclusion of credit agreements with the developing country, the principal component of which would be a program of measures in the field of domestic and foreign economic policy geared to the restoration of credit-worthiness (p 143). Plans for the creation of an "early warning" system (a mechanism making it possible to halt the development of crisis phenomena in the earliest phase possible) and the founding of a special international agency for relieving the private banks of a considerable amount of credit in default are examined also (pp 164, 165).

In conclusion the scholar draws the conclusion concerning the enhancement of the role of the IMF in recent years as a consequence of the stimulation of the search for new forms of government regulation of the currency and finance sphere and the marked shift of accents in its activity toward an increase in its impact directly on the nature of its members' general economic policy. At the same time he rightly believes that the Fund's further successes will be possible only on condition of the establishment of close equal cooperation in the sphere of currency and finances in the interests of all states, the surmounting of the differences on key issues between the members and the restructuring of IMF activity in the direction of its democratization (pp 167-169).

Among the book's minuses, in my view, may be put the fact that too much space is allotted therein the history of IMF activity under the conditions of the Bretton Woods currency system; this question has been illustrated in sufficient detail in Soviet economic literature already. The author should hardly have been examining a number of problems of the international capitalist currency system with merely an indirect bearing on IMF activity (formation and development, for example, of the Eurocurrency market, prospects of the functioning of the ECU, the causes and scale of the developing countries' debt crisis) to the detriment of a more thorough, detailed analysis of the role of the Fund itself.

#### Footnote

\* S.V. Gorbunov, "Mezhdunarodnyy valyutnyy fond: protivorechiya kapitalisticheskogo valyutnogo regulirovaniya" [The IMF: Contradictions of Capitalist Currency Regulation], Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp 176.

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#### Book on French Foreign Policy Thinking Reviewed

18160010g Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 89 pp 150-152

[K. Zuyeva review: "France: Foreign Policy Concepts"]

[Text] Soviet Francological literature has been supplemented by an interesting study\* which examines French foreign policy from an original angle. The author analyzes the main theories of international relations and foreign policy concepts advanced in the works of French politicians, diplomats, military specialists and scholars.

An extremely inadequate interaction between the foreign policy organizations and academic science was observed in France up to the mid-1970's. The expansion of studies in international relations was impeded by the absence of an "order" on the part of the ruling elite, which, as the book observes, is itself inclined to act "as the ideologue of its class" (p 7). It was impeded also by the traditional "domination" of legal sciences in French university and research centers.

However, as of the latter half of the 1970's the situation began to change somewhat. A whole number of international problem research centers—the French International Relations Institute, the National Defense Research Foundation and others—have been created under the auspices of the National Political Sciences Foundation and at the universities, in Paris primarily. They are engaged in the elaboration of a broad set of international problems, the theory of international relations included.

Of the French scholars who have attempted to elaborate a "global" theory of international relations, I. Tyulin has highlighted three of the most significant—the sociologist R. Aron, the historian J.-B. Duroselle and the political scientist M. Merle.

The first was an author of the theory of "de-ideologization" and the "industrial society," a convinced opponent of socialism and consistent defender of "Atlantism". Although the theoretical views of this venerable scholar were shaped under the influence of the American schools of "political realism" and "strategic analysis," his works were not a simple reiteration of the views of his transatlantic colleagues and contained many

original ideas. The book in question convincingly criticizes R. Aron's theoretical propositions, the basis of which were the philosophy of "strength" and the "balance of terror".

J.-B. Duroselle—the author of numerous works on the history of international relations and a student and follower of the most important French historian P. Renouvin—is quite a different figure. J.-B. Duroselle's views on the historical process by no means represent an integral theory. However, in the theoretical constructions which he propounds, in which the scholar endeavored, as the work observes, to substantiate a moderate course in world politics presupposing the use of "non-power," "traditional diplomatic means" (p 67), the author rightly discerns a number of shortcomings. It is primarily a question of an exaggeration of subjective features: putting at the center of his idea the activity of the individual, J.-B. Duroselle reduces the analysis of international relations to ascertainment of the influence on its behavior of biological and psychological factors.

The attempt at the creation of a theory of international relations made by M. Merle, professor at the University of Paris, appears to I. Tyulin the most "professional". "Merle attempts to examine international relations as a system and to study current relations and processes in the channel of a systemic approach" (p 67). The book notes positive aspects in the scholar's views, specifically, the fruitfulness of the analysis of the activity of international government organizations and "transnational forces". At the same time numerous flaws in his theory, which lead to the conclusion that "the creation of a scientific, global theory is beyond the powers of contemporary French foreign policy thought" (p 76), are shown also.

In addition to criticism of the attempts to create general theoretical constructions, the monograph also studies "particular" French theories encompassing questions of the formation of the state's foreign policy (M. Merle, R. Debray), strategy, conflict solution and international security (A. Boffre, L. Poirier, P.-M. Gallois, R. Aron, [L. Amon, P. Assner] and others).

The author shows that the choice of "particular" theories is closely connected with the general direction of France's foreign policy course and its particular position in the international arena. But the absence of a correct methodological basis, descriptiveness and the detachment of foreign from domestic policy—all this leads to the distortion of the complex phenomena of international life in the mirror of French theoretical studies.

The most extensive section of the monograph is devoted to foreign policy concepts, which, as distinct from the theory of international relations, occupy the leading place in the country's contemporary foreign policy thought. The evolution of Gaullist foreign policy doctrine, the basis of which was the idea of the greatness of France and the strengthening of its independence and authority, is traced. The path of realization of this

doctrine lay via the establishment of "balance not only within the camp of imperialism or between the industrially developed Western countries and the 'third world' but also between the socialist world and the capitalist world" (p 99). The foreign policy of the Fifth Republic was closely connected with military doctrine geared to France's military independence based on its own nuclear deterrent force. The work sets forth in detail the factors which entailed changes in Gaullist doctrine and the evolution of policy in respect of the socialist and developing countries under G. Pompidou, V. Giscard d'Estaing and F. Mitterrand.

The author's attention was attracted also by the synthesis of European and Atlantic views "on whose basis a new approach which came to be called 'Euro-Atlantism' took shape in French policy thought" (p 129). It is a question of the ideas, widespread in France, of "Euro-Atlantic security" providing for the indivisibility of the security of the United States and West Europe, which are supported by many politicians, scholars and military figures. In the author's opinion, the concepts of the French Euro-Atlantists are "pushing Europe and, consequently, France" toward increased military danger and international tension on the continent, the undermining of trust between European states and the blocking of the all-European process (p 141).

The book devotes a significant place also to ideological and theoretical struggle around the French strategy of "deterrence," in which the representatives of two schools—the "purists" (supporters of Gaullist military thought—Generals L. Poirier and P.-M. Gallois and the political scientists J. Klein, [P. Dabzi] and others) and the "revisionists" (supporters of a revision of Gaullist strategy—R. Aron, [P. Assner, L. Amon], F. de Rose, P. Lellouche and others)—participated. There are in France also alternative concepts substantiating a transition to nuclear disarmament. However, the ideas of the majority of theorists "are still far from recognizing that security cannot be infinitely built on terror in the face of nuclear retribution, that is, 'deterrence' doctrine, and that the nature of present weapons leaves no state the hope of protecting itself only by military-technical means, even with the creation of the most powerful defenses" (p 155).

An important direction of foreign policy, on which the views of French theorists have been far from identical, has been the relations of France, the former possessor of an immense colonial empire, with the developing countries. The author sets forth in detail the evolution of this direction, which, following the granting of the colonies political independence, has been based on the concept of so-called "mutual development" and "cooperation".

An alternative view of France's policy in the "third world" which was called "tiers-mondism" and which acquired "a moralistic and humanitarian coloring" (p 161), was elaborated by theorists of the French Socialist Party. The socialists proclaimed solidarity with national liberation movements. However, the basis of this

approach was primarily an endeavor to prevent the spread in these countries of the ideas of socialism.

The socialists are opposed by conservative theorists of the right, "anti-tiers-mondists," who are urging the use of interventionist methods in the "third world" and rejecting the establishment of a just international economic order. The "tiers-mondists'" incapacity for successfully confronting conservative tendencies is impeding the formation in French foreign policy thought of a realistic approach to France's relations with the developing countries.

In conclusion I. Tyulin concludes that in the latter half of the 1970's-first half of the 1980's a significant step to the right showed through in the positions of the majority of theorists. Their "orientation toward a toughening of the approach to the USSR, the strengthening of imperialist solidarity and the preservation of nuclear weapons as the permanent foundation of both national and international security" (p 169) could have negative consequences for the interests of the country as a whole and the preservation of general peace.

The book in question is a serious contribution to the study of the theoretical foundations of French foreign policy: the more so in that these topics have escaped attention in Soviet Francological literature.

#### Footnote

\* I.G. Tyulin, "Vneshnepoliticheskaya mysl sovremennoy Frantsii" [Foreign Policy Thought of Present-Day France], Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp184.

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#### Biographical Information on Book Reviewers

18160010h Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 89 p 152

[Text] Leonid Grigoryevich Istyagin, candidate of historical sciences, lead scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO.

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Aleksandr Anatolyevich Sergunin, candidate of historical sciences, senior lecturer of the Gorkiy State University imeni N.I. Lobachevskiy.

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#### List of Books Recently Published

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[Text] B.N. Bannerjee, "The Indian Ocean: Zone of Tension," translated from the English, Moscow, "Progress", 1988, pp271.

"World History of Economic Thought". In six volumes. Head of the Editorial Board V.N. Cherkovets et al. Moscow, "Mysl", 1988, vol 2, pp575.

A.A. Goryachev, Yu.Yu. Korlyugov, "The Socialist Countries' Foreign Trade: Problems of Management and Efficiency," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp232.

A.G. Granberg, "Modeling of the Socialist Economy," Moscow, "Ekonomika", 1988, pp487.

V.F. Davydov, "Nuclear-Free Zones and International Security," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp192.

"Demographic Policy From a Regional Angle". Executive Editor G.M. Romanenkova, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp164.

B.A. Denisov, A.M. Zobov, I.V. Chugunova, "The Modern State and the Economy," Moscow, "Sovetskaya Rossiya", 1988, pp222.

"For Peace and the Peoples' Security. USSR Foreign Policy Documents. 1970". In two books. Book 2. "September-December". Editorial Board: A.L. Adamishin et al. Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp 312.

"West Europe: Paradoxes of Regulation". Executive editors V.N. Shenayev, doctor of economic sciences, V.I. Kuznetsov, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, "Mysl", 1988, pp248.

A.A. Igolkin, V.V. Motylev, "The International Division of Labor: Models, Trends, Forecasts," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp184.

A.A. Kovalev, "The Self-Determination and Economic Independence of the Peoples," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp160.

Aleksandr Lebedev, "Outline of British Foreign Policy (1960's-1980's)," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp304.

Yu. Levin, "Interstate Regulation of Raw Material Markets (Developing Countries' Struggle for the Stabilization of International Trade)," Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp208.

M.S. Lyubskiy, "International Credit Relations of the CEMA Countries," Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp264.

L.I. Medvedko, A.V. Germanovich, "In the Name of Allah.... Politicization of Islam and Islamization of Policy," Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp255.

"International Yearbook. Politics and Economics". 1988 edition. Chief Editor O.N. Bykov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp304.

V.A. Nazarevskiy, "Control of S&T Progress in U.S. Industry". Executive Editor A.V. Anikin, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp144.

D.S. Nikiforov, A.F. Borunkov, "Diplomatic Protocol in the USSR: Principles, Rules, Practice". Second, supplemented edition. Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp332.

Yu.K. Osipov, "The United States—S&T Leader?" Executive Editor A.I. Shapiro, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp158.

J. Perez de Cuellar, "The United Nations: Present and Future. Statements and Reports of the UN Secretary General". Translated from the English. Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1988, pp415.

"Political Economy." For VUZ's (V.A. Medvedev et al.), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp735.

B.V. Pospelov, "Ideological Currents of Present-Day Japan. Critical Analysis," Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp301.

"Principles of the Functioning of the U.S. Two-Party System: History and Modern Trends". Part 1. "End of 18th Century-1917". Executive Editor Ye.F. Yazkov, Moscow, Izdatelstvo MGU, 1988, pp287.

S.V. Pyatenko, "Credit-Monetary Policy in the United States". Executive Editor A.V. Anikin, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp158.

T. Skidmore, "Human Property Rights". Translated from the English. Commentary and introductory article by K.M. Anderson, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp446.

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G.M. Sturua, "Peaceful Waters for the Oceans," Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp103.

"Control of Socialist Economic Integration". Executive Editor V.M. Shastitko, Moscow, "Nauka", 1988, pp188.

Ye.V. Foteyeva, "The Family in the Modern Bourgeois World," Moscow, "Mysl", 1988, pp208.

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### News of Institute Meetings, Activities

18160010j Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 89 pp 154-155

[Text] "The Center and Periphery of the World Capitalist Economy" was the subject of scientific-theoretical conference organized by the Developing Countries and Nonaligned Movement Center (IMEMO). Staff of a number of academy institutes—Oriental Studies, Latin America, International Workers Movement and Africa—and Leningrad State University participated also.

The fundamental propositions of the papers of Candidate of Economic Sciences A.A. Solonitskiy and Doctor of Economic Sciences Yu.V. Shishkov and of the majority of speeches were constructed on an understanding of the world capitalist economy (WCE) as a self-developing system. Relations between its parts and center and periphery are not an antagonistic contrast but internal contradictory, constantly changing interaction. And participation in this single economic organism is objectively profitable to each country, moreover, whatever the level of development it is at. All the subjects of the WCE have an interest in the normal functioning of the system as a whole.

Despite the intensification of the differences in the conditions of reproduction in different groups of states, the "threads" binding economic and social processes within the WCE are multiplying. A cardinal important role in the consolidation of individual components of the system is performed by the TNC and transnational banks, whose expansion in the peripheral zones is based on regularities of the world market and is creating distinctive self-tuning mechanisms. Whence the particular significance in study of the evolution of the relationships of the center and periphery of the WCE of a thorough analysis of the transnationalization process and its specifics in the "third world".

In the course of the discussion the growing differentiation of the periphery of the WCE was seen as an important feature of its development. It was emphasized here that the group of new industrial countries is becoming a connecting link mediating technological, production, commercial, financial and other relations between the center and the middle and lower echelons of the periphery. At the same time the number of the poorest states becoming increasingly detached not only from the West but also from a number of peripheral countries also is growing. As a result

a new factor of the evolution of the WCE, whose distinctiveness is that the developed states are being forced to assume the burden of maintaining these countries' level of viability mainly via aid mechanisms, is taking shape.

An important place in the course of the conference was assigned methodological aspects of study of problems of the interaction of the center and periphery, specifically, the influence of S&T progress on the development of relationships within the WCE. The expediency of the use of categories and methods of the neoclassical school of non-Marxist political economy (Ye.B. Arefyev, IMEMO) and the need for the elaboration and introduction in scientific use of new qualitative indicators more fully reflecting the particular features of economic growth (V.A. Yashkin, USSR Academy of Sciences Oriental Studies Institute) were, for example, pointed out. A number of speeches broached the question of the methodology of assessment of the overall picture of the world economy, specifically, the possibility of its separation into three technological modes of production (V.L. Sheynis).

A session of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Academic Council heard and discussed a paper by Doctor of Economic Sciences S.Ye. Blagovolin, head of the Military-Economic and Military-Political Research Department, entitled "Military Power Under Current Conditions". As the speaker emphasized, the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference on the need for a political approach to the solution of the contradictions of world development and the settlement of conflict situations and the release of resources for the needs of peaceful creation and on the strict conformity of defense development to defensive doctrine confront our science with a number of difficult tasks connected with an adequate assessment of the role and place of military power in the present situation, choice of its optimum parameters and so forth.

As the paper observed, a principal problem today is an objective evaluation of the extent to which and under what conditions military power is capable of performing its main function—safeguarding the country's security and its vital interests and the reliability and efficiency of existing alliances. Moving to the forefront in the current situation is the question of the correspondence to the changed tasks of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the country's military power and emphatic renunciation of the orientation in this sphere toward "gross" indicators which not only do not now ensure the acutely necessary reserve of strength but, on the contrary, intensify the quite complex military-political situation.

S.Ye. Blagovolin dwelt in detail on the problems associated with a more diverse, precise reflection in the process of military organizational development of the approaches to ensuring security advanced by the 27th CPSU Congress and the need for an in-depth analysis of geopolitical realities and formulation of the criteria for arriving at the optimum parameters of military power—both nuclear and "conventional". Among the most important questions illustrated in the paper were an evaluation of the present

path of the "formation" of military power from the viewpoint of the long-term assignments of ensuring the country's defense (whether it guarantees security for the long term even if attended by considerable costs today), the influence of the process of the creation and preservation of military power on the economy and specific features thereof under the conditions of the new stage of the S&T revolution, the connection with the economic reform and a description of the latest trends in the military-economic activity of Western countries. The speech paid considerable attention to, *inter alia*, problems of the correlation between military power and political influence and its role in the process of acquiring allies and the emergence of "natural" alliances and optimization of the balance between military power and other factors of influence of countries and their associations as an important condition of the long-term stability of their foreign policy positions.

Prof Kurt Hans Biedenkopf, member of the West German Bundestag for the Christian Democratic Union and member of the board of the Economics and Policy Institute (Bonn), was a guest of the IMEMO. He had meetings with Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the IMEMO, Deputy Director O.N. Bykov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Deputy Director I.Ye. Guryev, doctor of economic sciences, in the course of which questions of, in particular, the development of East-West relations, the building of the "all-European home," bilateral relations and cooperation in the economic and scientific spheres and so forth were discussed. A discussion was held with the guest in the IMEMO editorial office, which will be published in a coming issue. As a prominent theorist and ideologist of contemporary conservatism, K.H. Biedenkopf delivered to the scholars of the institute and research personnel two lectures which evoked lively interest and the questioning reaction of the large audience.

Rihard Wagner, member of the staff of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Trade Research Institute, visited the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. His conversation with Soviet colleagues was devoted mainly to a discussion of problems of the development of foreign trade in services in the socialist countries and also the present state of affairs in study of the corresponding problems of economic science. Thus the guest inquired after methodological singularities of statistical accounting in this sphere of economic relations. There was an exchange of opinions concerning evaluations of the accumulated practical experience of the solution of this problem in the balances of payments of certain Western countries and the work performed within the GATT and OECD framework encountering difficulties and obstacles here. Great attention was paid to ways of improving trade in so-called "factor services" as a most promising direction. The parties agreed that the development of trade in such services in the socialist countries, on the foreign market included, was inseparably connected with important steps pertaining to the implementation of radical economic transformations and the enterprises' genuine economic independence.

Problems of the restructuring of the mechanism of the control of foreign economic relations, primarily the use of differentiated currency coefficients, transition to an economically substantiated exchange rate for the Soviet ruble and the use of customs tariffs and dues and also the participation of the cooperative organizations in foreign trade were discussed in the course of a conversation between IMEMO specialists and Gerard Duchesne, professor of economics at Lille University (France), who was visiting the institute. He expressed, inter alia, the opinion that transition to the use of a realistic ruble exchange rate would correspond to a greater extent to the tasks of strengthening and improving the USSR's foreign economic relations. At the same time, of course, such a currency exchange rate would affect the interests of many enterprises, which under present conditions continue to enjoy budget subsidies in the sphere of both their exports and imports. It is essential here, the professor believes, to activate a system of taxes and customs dues. To realize the potential opportunities of the cooperatives' participation in foreign economic activity, he observed, it is necessary to provide for their close, genuinely economic ties to the Soviet and overseas foreign trade organizations and establishments.

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#### Articles in MEMO Not Translated

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